
JAIST Forum 2006

- Knowledge Creation and Social Innovation -



平成 18 年 11 月

北陸先端科学技術大学院大学

開催概要

日時 2006年11月10日(金) 10:30~18:00

会 場 北陸先端科学技術大学院大学知識科学研究科「中講義室」

プログラム内容

10:30-10:40

Akio Makishima (Vice President, JAIST)

Opening Address and a Brief Introduction to JAIST

10:40-11:00

Yoshiteru Nakamori (Professor, JAIST)

A Brief Introduction to the School of Knowledge Science and a COE Program

11:00-12:00

Andrzej P. Wierzbicki (Professor, JAIST)

Knowledge Sciences and Nanatsudaki Model of Knowledge Creation Processes

12:00-13:30 Lunch Time

13:30-14:30

Robert Kneller (Professor, The University of Tokyo)

Knowledge Creation and Application in a Local Context: Cooperation with local industry and creation of new companies.

14:30-15:30

Nico Stehr (Professor, Zeppelin University)

Worlds of Knowledge and Democracy: Is Civil Society a Daughter of Knowledge?

15:30-16:00 Break

16:00-17:00

Michael C. Jackson (Professor, The Business School at Hull)

Reflections on Knowledge Management from a Critical Systems Perspective

17:00-18:00

Ikujiro Nonaka (Professor, Hitotsubashi University)

The Knowledge-Creating Company: Strategy, Ba, Leadership

Strategy -as- Distributed Phronesis

Akio Makishima

Yoshiteru Nakamori



Andrzej P. Wierzbicki



Robert Kneller





Nico Stehr



Michael C. Jackson




Ikujiro Nonaka





講演資料

*講演順







Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (JAIST) was founded in 1990 as the first independent national university to carry out graduate research and education in science and technology.




President Sukekatsu Ushioda



Ishikawa Science Park was built in the hill area of rich green Tatsunokuchi town in 1990, aiming at promoting cooperation among the government, industry, and academy in advanced technology field, and making an international research and development base.

Outline of JAIST		
Area of Campus:	~100,000m ²	
Doctoral Program International Studen 	~150 ~150 ~1000 ~700 ~300 ts: ~170 ~70 MillionsUS dollar	

JAIST Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology Outline of Organizations		
Schools School of Information Science (since 1992 M: 264 D: 117) School of Materials Science (since 1993 M: 250 D: 111) School of Knowledge Science (since 1998 M: 180 D: 90)		
Centers and Laboratories Center for Knowledge Science Center for Information Science Center for Nano Materials and Technology Center for Research and Investigation of Advanced Science and Technology Research Center for Distance Learning Internet Research Center Center for Strategic Development of Science and Technology Venture Business Laboratory Health Care Center		
Library		



JAIST Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology

Our university is known for its unique educational policy. While traditional graduate schools in Japan tend to encourage early specialization, our policy is to expose the students first to a systematic course work through a carefully prepared curriculum. Our aim is to cultivate professionals with a broad background and interest to be adaptable to the quickly changing world of science and technology today. For this purpose the students are encouraged to take some basic courses, before joining a research group to specialize in a particular field.

Our admission is open to all students who have a strong motivation to advance their knowledge and ability regardless of the undergraduate background. We admit many people including professionals who want retraining in a new field, foreign students, and graduates who want a challenge in a new field. To facilitate students from diverse backgrounds, we offer several introductory courses to allow students to efficiently catch up to the frontiers of respective fields.

We aim at graduating scientists and engineers who can work effectively in global environments. For this purpose our faculty members and students are recruited worldwide, creating a campus with a cosmopolitan atmosphere in which English is used as a second language. We welcome faculty and students from all parts of the world.

School of Information Science

Department of Information Processing

Foundations of Information Science Computational Logic Programming Languages Natural Language Processing Knowledge Engineering Artificial Intelligence Image Information Science Acoustic Information Science Information Structure

Department of Information Systems

Foundations of Software Language Design Software Engineering Computer Architecture Multi-Media Systems Computer Networks Foundations of System Science System Control and Management Robotics





High Performance Database Processing Computing System (Altix)





Massively Parallel Computer (Cray-T3E)

Center for Information Science










JAIST Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology International exchanges

JAIST has concluded agreements on academic exchanges between the following 38 institutions in foreign countries in order to develop exchanges of personnel and research cooperation.

- 1. Royal Institution of Great Britain (UK)
- 2. Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (Korea)
- 3. Novosibirsk State University (Russia)
- Charles University (Czech)
 University of Paris IX (France)
- 6. University of California, Davis (USA)
- University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee (USA)
 Kyungpook National University (Korea)
- 9. The University of Chile (Chile)
- 10. University of South Florida (USA)
- 11. Korea Institute of Science and Technology (Korea)
- 12. Academy of Mathematics and Systems Sciences, Chinese Academy of Sciences (China)
- 13. Dalian University of Technology (China)
- 14. Tsinghua University (China)
- 15. Vietnam National Center for Natural Science and Technology (Vietnam)
- 16. Hanoi University of Science (Vietnam)
- 17. Chulalongkorn University (Thailand)





School of Knowledge Science at JAIST

Human society is becoming increasingly complex. If science remains segmented into specialized disciplines, we cannot deal effectively with multifaceted problems which we now face. Thus, we need a new integrative science that is founded on the deep understanding of humanity and society.

In view of this need, the School of Knowledge Science has embarked upon a new initiative that aims to discover both theoretical and practical principles of knowledge management (i.e., management of creating new knowledge and integrating it with existing knowledge), thereby developing new knowledge systems for decision making and problem solving.

To that end, the School has enlisted not only natural scientists and engineers but also social scientists and humanities scholars. These faculty members conduct research into:

(a) innovative methods for solving complex problems; and

(b) man-computer systems that support such problem-solving activities.

The School also provides master's and doctoral programs to educate professionals (e.g., project-team leaders and knowledge engineers) and knowledge scientists equipped with such knowledge-creating methods as fieldwork, statistical analysis, simulation, knowledge engineering, etc. They are expected to become pioneers of the knowledge society.

School of Knowledge Science at JAIST

Introductory Lectures

Introduction to Business Economics Social Statistics Introduction to Logic Introduction to Mathematical Approaches Introduction to Computer Programming Introduction to Data Processing

Basic Lectures


Methodology for Social Sciences Methodology of Knowledge Base Methodology for Systems Science Methodology of Artificial Intelligence Innovation Management Knowledge Theory of Physical Science Design of Knowledge Science Embodied Cognitive Science Intelligent Modeling Jaba Programming for Web Applications Network Programming Methodology for Knowledge Creation Systems Methodology for Media Creation Systems


Intermediate Lectures


Theory of Knowledge Management Knowledge Society Comparative Study of Knowledge Institutions Complex Systems Analysis Knowledge Systems of Materials Methodology for Knowledge Discovery Representation of Knowledge Research and Development Management Essence of Systems Methodologies Theory on Creation Process in Design Design Semiotics


Advanced Lectures

Next-Generation Management of Technology Next-Generation Knowledge Management Socio-Technical Complex Systems Media Environment for Knowledge Emergence New Generation Knowledge-based Systems Bioinformatics












New Subject: Theory of Local Area Reactiva	ation Participants
	Local government: 34 Local industry: 19 NPO etc.: 20
August 1, 2006: Forum on Local Area Reactivation	Students: 37
September 16-17: Lectures and Group Discussion	
October 14-15: Lectures and Group Discussion November 12: Lectures and Group Discussion November 13: Symposium on Local Area reactivation	Reactivation Planning Group 1: Biomass town Group 2: Tourism Group 3: Lacquer ware industry Group 4: Urban renewal Group 5: NPO
Lectures: I. Tachi (The Cabinet Office) Y. Wakabayashi (The Cabinet Office) H. Suematsu (The Cabinet Office)	Group 6: Health and welfare

- T. Kimura (The Cabinet Office)
- S. Misono (The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare)
- S. Kaneko (The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry)
- K. Fujimoto (The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries)







Knowledge Sciences and Nanatsudaki Model of Knowledge Creation Processes

Andrzej P. Wierzbicki*,** Yoshiteru Nakamori*,

*JAIST, School of Knowledge Science, 21st Century COE *Technology Creation Based on Knowledge Science,* and ** National Institute of Telecommunications

- 1. Changing civilization eras and changing episteme
- 2. The emergence of knowledge sciences
- 3. The Creative Space, the Knowledge Pentagram and the Triple Helix
- 4. The need and character of *prescriptive* models: the *Nanatsudaki Model*
- 5. The Nanatsudaki Model: detailed elements
- 6. Tests
- 7. Conclusions

1. Changing civilization eras and changing episteme

- There is a universal agreement that we are living in times of an *informational revolution* which leads to a new era
- Knowledge in this era plays an even more important role than just information, thus the new epoch might be called *knowledge civilization era*
- Many other names were used: **postindustrial**, **information**, **postcapitalist**, **informational**, **networked** (society) etc.
- Between many changes, the most important one might be the changing *episteme* – the way of constructing and justifying knowledge
- The destruction of the *industrial episteme* and the construction of a new one started with relativism of Einstein, indeterminism of Heisenberg, with the concept of feedback and that of deterministic chaos, of order emerging out of chaos, complexity theories, finally – with the *emergence principle*

1. Changing civilization eras and episteme, 2

- The industrial episteme believed in reduction principle that the behavior of a complex system can be explained by the reduction to the behavior of its parts – which is valid only if the level of complexity of the system is rather low
- The systemic principles of *holism* and *synergy* stressed that the whole is more than the sum of its parts; but *the change of episteme is even further reaching*
- With very complex systems today, biology, mathematical modeling, technical and information sciences adhere rather to emergence principle – the emergence of new properties of a system with increased level of complexity, qualitatively different than and irreducible to the properties of its parts (such as software is irreducible to hardware)
- The emergence principle expresses the essence of complexity; it means much more than synergy or holism which concepts do not stress irreducibility

1. Changing civilization eras and episteme, 3


- The destruction of the *industrial era episteme* (sometimes called not quite precisely *positivism* or *scientism*) resulted in a *divergent developments of the episteme of three cultural spheres:*
- hard sciences,
- > technology,
- social sciences with humanities
- Hard sciences, since Heisenberg and Quine know that all human knowledge "is a man-made fabric that impinges on existence only along the edges", but they still believe that their role is to uncover that way the true laws of nature; thus they value objective aspects of knowledge, but also paradigms
- Technology is less paradigmatic (follows rather falsificationism of Popper than paradigms of Kuhn) and more relativist in its episteme, admits that knowledge represents only man-made models of nature, but even stronger insists on objectivity as a value, needed, e.g., when trying to increase the reliability of contemporary cars or computer networks

1. Changing civilization eras and episteme, 4

- A part of social science went much further to maintain that all knowledge is subjective results from a discourse, is constructed, negotiated, relativist. The farthest in such interpretations is postmodernism maintaining that the concept of objectivity serves only to hide the real motivations of scientific development power and money, e.g., (Latour 1990).
- To this hard science and technology respond, however, that this denial of objectivity comes from social sciences that have themselves limited possibilities of experimental tests. Thus, this denial might be suspected to be a self-serving attempt of *destroying the values of different cultural spheres* because they are inconvenient for the own cultural sphere of social sciences.
- Moreover, objectivity (treated not as an absolute requirement, but as an ideal to be pursued) should be seen as a value, a concept emerging on a higher level of complexity of civilization development, irreducible to concepts of lower level – such as power and money

1. Changing civilization eras and episteme, 5

- The episteme of knowledge civilization is not formed yet, but it must include an integration, a synthesis of the divergent episteme of these three cultural spheres – as well as a synthesis of different aspects of Oriental and Occidental episteme; it cannot be based on a single and extreme epistemological view, such as the episteme of postmodern social sciences.
- The integration must be based upon a *holistic understanding* of human nature: humanity is defined not only by communicating, also by tool making.
- An attempt at such integration is made at JAIST, in the School of Knowledge Science; but the controversies presented above are deep and indicate to us that we should rather *speak about knowledge sciences in plural, respect their diversity* and expect their integration in future.



2. The emergence of knowledge sciences, 2

- It is correct that knowledge management cannot be reduced to management of information, but such a correct assessment is a pitfall (of binary logic): if you are sure to be right, it is easy to overlook both the complexity and the essence of the controversy.
- The complexity relates to the fact that knowledge management has started with technology and cannot continue without technology.
- The essence of the controversy is the fact that *management of people* should be also understood as *management of knowledge workers;* and knowledge workers are today often mostly information technologists, who should be well understood by managers. Thus, we believe that the two views listed above incompletely describe what knowledge management is; there is a third, essential view, seeing knowledge management:
 - As management of human resources in knowledge civilization era, concentrating on knowledge workers, their education and qualities, assuming a proper understanding of technologists and technology

2. The emergence of knowledge sciences, 3

- Moreover:
- Both knowledge engineering and technology management are separate disciplines from knowledge management and their practitioners often would not agree to be subsumed by knowledge management, while knowledge management specialists have a tendency to include everything what might be useful into their discipline.
- A proper, essential meaning of the word technology is the art of designing and constructing tools and technological artifacts, and this sense is included in the phrase technology management (Heidegger 1954, Wierzbicki 2005).
- Technology management might obviously be useful for knowledge management; but it is an older discipline, using well developed concepts and processes, such as technology assessment, technology foresight and technology roadmapping. Only recently, some of these processes have been also adapted to knowledge management, see (Ma et al. 2005).

2. The emergence of knowledge sciences, 4


- B. All the above discussion implies that we are observing now a need for and an emergence process of a new understanding of knowledge sciences
- This is not a discipline but rather interdisciplinary field that goes beyond the classical *epistemology*, includes also some aspects of *knowledge engineering* from information technology, some aspects of *knowledge management* from management and social science, some aspects of *technology management*, some aspects of *interdisciplinary synthesis* and other techniques (such as decision analysis and support, multiple criteria analysis, etc.) from *systems science*
- This emergence process is motivated primarily by the needs of an adequate education of *knowledge workers* and *knowledge managers and coordinators;* however, also the research on knowledge and technology management and creation needs such interdisciplinary support


2. The emergence of knowledge sciences, 5


- To summarize, we should thus require that *knowledge sciences* give home to several disciplines (in an alphabetic order):
- > Epistemology,
- > Knowledge engineering,
- > Management science, knowledge management,
- Sociological (soft) systems science,
- > Technology management,
- > Technological (hard) systems science,
- on *equal footing,* with a requirement of mutual information and understanding

3. The Creative Space, the Knowledge Pentagram and the Triple Helix

- Since the Shinayakana Systems Approach (Nakamori and Sawaragi, 1990) and the Knowledge Creating Company (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995), many theories of creating knowledge for the needs of today and tomorrow were developed.
- We might call them *micro-theories of knowledge creation*, as distinct from the philosophical theories of knowledge creation on the long term, historical macro-scale that usually do not help in current knowledge creation.
- All such micro-theories take into account the *tacit, intuitive, emotional, even mythical aspects* of knowledge. Many of them can be represented in the form of *spirals of knowledge creation processes,* describing the interplay between tacit and explicit or intuitive and rational knowledge, following the *SECI* (*Socialization-Externalization-Combination-Internalization*) *Spiral* of Nonaka and Takeuchi.
- In Wierzbicki and Nakamori (2006), a synthesis of such microtheories of knowledge creation takes the form of so-called *Creative Space – a network-like model of diverse creative processes with many nodes and transitions* between them. Many spirals of knowledge creation can be represented as processes in *Creative Space*.








3. The Creative Space, the Knowledge Pentagram and the Triple Helix, 5

- As a conclusion from *Creative Space*, we should distinguish between:
- group-based, industrial organizational knowledge creation processes such as the SECI Spiral, or its Occidental counterpart called OPEC Spiral (Gasson 2004), or an older and well known organizational process called brainstorming that can be also represented as a DCCV Spiral (Kunifuji 2005)
- individual-based, academic knowledge creation processes, describing how knowledge is normally created in academia and research institutions.
- For the latter type, three processes of normal knowledge creation in academia are described in Wierzbicki and Nakamori (2006):
- Hermeneutics (gathering scientific information and knowledge from literature, web and other sources, interpreting and reflecting on these materials), represented as the EAIR (Enlightenment-Analysis-Immersion-Reflection) Spiral;
- Debate (discussing in a group research under way, reflecting on the results), represented as the EDIS (Enlightenment-Debate-Immersion-Selection) Spiral;
- Experiment (testing ideas and hypotheses by experimental research, interpreting results), represented as the EEIS (Enlightenment-Experiment-Interpretation-Selection) Spiral.



3. The Creative Space, the Knowledge Pentagram and the Triple Helix, 7: Hermeneutics

- The humanistic concept of *hermeneutics* (interpreting texts) describes the most basic activity for any research that of gathering from outside sources relevant information and knowledge, interpreting them and reflecting on them.
- A full cycle of the *most individual EAIR Spiral* consists of:
- Enlightenment, having a research idea, then following it with ideas where and how to find research materials;
- Analysis, which is a rational analysis of the research materials;
- Hermeneutic Immersion, which means some time (Ma) needed to absorb the results of analysis into individual intuitive perception of the object of study;
- Reflection, which denotes intuitive preparation of the resulting new ideas.
- Hermeneutics is well recognized in humanistic studies; the novel aspects of *EAIR Spiral* are *closing the hermeneutic circle by the power of intuition,* and stressing the *universal role of hermeneutics in knowledge creation,* also in hard science and in technology, not only in humanistic studies.


3. The Creative Space, the Knowledge Pentagram and the Triple Helix, 8: Debate

- Intersubjective EDIS Spiral describes also one of the most fundamental and well known processes of normal knowledge creation in academia:
- After having an idea due to the *Enlightenment* phenomenon, an individual researcher might want to check it intersubjectively,
- Scientific Debate actually has two layers: one is verbal and rational, but after some time for reflection (Ma) we also derive intuitive conclusions from this debate.
- This is the extremely important and in fact difficult transition called *Immersion* (of the results of debate in group intuition); it occurs as a transition from group rationality to group intuition.
- An individual researcher does not necessarily accept all the results of group intuition, she or he makes his own Selection in the transition from group intuition to individual intuition.
- This process can gain momentum by repetition: second *Debate* might be much enriched by group intuition resulting from *Immersion*; this is called the *Principle of Double Debate*.
- Again, this academic knowledge creation process is well known; new is stressing the interplay of rational and intuitive aspects of knowledge, emphasizing the power of Immersion and the Principle of Double Debate.

19


3. The Creative Space, the Knowledge Pentagram and the Triple Helix, 9: Experiment


- Academic knowledge creation is not only hermeneutic and intersubjective; in many disciplines it requires also experimental research. This is described by a corresponding *experimental EEIS Spiral* that also starts with:
- The transition *Enlightenment*, this time indicating the idea of an experiment,
- followed by *Experiment* performing the actual experimental work,
- then by *Interpretation* of the experimental results reaching into intuitive experimental experience of the researcher,
- finally Selection of ideas to stimulate a new Enlightenment.
- This cycle can be repeated as many times as needed, but usually requires support: *adaptive experiment planning, experiment reporting*, etc.
- Novel is not the well known process, but its *interpretation as a spiral, an interplay of rational and intuitive knowledge.*
- Experiment is the basis of objectivity, understood not as the requirement of a positivist truth, but as a goal of developing theories that correspond as adequately as possible to experimental facts, as a value shared by hard sciences and technology (not necessarily by postmodern social sciences).





4. The need and character of *prescriptive* models: the *Nanatsudaki Model,* 1


- Descriptive models constitute knowledge (typical for science); prescriptive models are tools (typical for technology). E.g., MS Powerpoint is a prescription how to prepare overheads. We need both!
- The *Triple Helix* indicates that *normal academic research processes* are essentially different than *organizational knowledge creation processes,* typical for business, industry, goal-oriented organizations, such as described by:
- > The SECI Spiral (organizational, but of Oriental character);
- > The **OPEC Spiral** (organizational, but of Occidental character);
- The Brainstorming DCCV Spiral (goal-oriented, of crosscultural character, the oldest organizational knowledge creation process, represented as a spiral by Kunifuji 2004);
- The Roadmapping I⁵ Spiral (another interpretation of the Pentagram System of Nakamori, goal-oriented, with the purpose of roadmapping or detailed planning of knowledge creation processes)














5. The Nanatsudaki Model: 3) Socialization.
9. Specific Spiral – Socialization. We could perform here all transitions of SECI Spiral, as presented earlier, see e.g. Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995); but most important in our context is Socialization.



5. The Nanatsudaki Model: 4) Brainstorming
4) Brainstorming DCCV Spiral – Divergence. The full cycle of the DCCV Spiral can be performed:
Divergence: generating and listing as many ideas as possible;
Convergence: selecting most helpful ideas;
Crystallization: improvement of the best ideas;
Verification: applying and thus testing these ideas;
but in the Nanatsudaki Model, concentration on the Divergence transition suffices.





5. The Nanatsudaki Model: 5) Debate 5) Debating EDIS Spiral – Critical Debate (described earlier). We use the transition **Debate** for a rational organization of ideas. We separate this stage from the former **Brainstorming** by some time (*Ma*) in order to immerse the results of the former stage into intuition of project participants. intuitive Immersion rational nowledge knowledge <mark>knowledge</mark> Selection Debate individual intuitive Enlightenment individual rational knowledge knowledge 32



33

5. The Nanatsudaki Model: 6)Roadmapping 6) Roadmapping I⁵ Spiral – detailed planning of further résearch: > Intelligence: summarizing all results of individual hermeneutic activities for the group use; Involvement: consultations with the future users of the results of research project; Imagination: immersing the consultation outcomes, preparing the ground for a new integration; > Integration: working out a mature form of the roadmap for further research activities. rational knowledge (Consult) Intelligence Imagination (Reflect) (Collect) integrated knowledge Integration knowledge (Integrate) Intervention (Problem) 34







5. The Nanatsudaki Model: 8) Closure


- 8) Closure: a different cycle of entire process
- How the process of **Nanatsudaki Model** should end? A report of results obtained, a reflection on this summary of results, on their possible future implications and use, is always necessary upon completing a research project or an important stage of it.
- We suggest to use for this purpose another cycle of the entire Nantsudaki Model process, suitably modified and shortened, if necessary, to fit the purpose of reporting or to summarizing the results.
- For example, a new Socialization might be used to informally exchange ideas about the importance and future applications of results; Brainstorming might be performed again, if some future applications deserve it; Debate might help in the best summary and presentation of entire project; Roadmapping and Implementation might be not needed, but a review of original roadmap comparing it with actual developments might be helpful in reporting.


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6. Tests
 A question might be asked: <i>why did we select precisely these</i> creative spirals and this particular order of them? We can answer that we did it <i>on the basis of our intuitive, tacit knowledge, resulting from many years of our experience in the management of research activities,</i> and that the validation of any prescriptive model requires its application. However, even if such response gives some justification to the <i>Nantsudaki Model</i>, it does not provide its full substantiation. Therefore, we validate the <i>Nanatsudaki Model</i> in several stages. One is already performed and consisted in a survey of opinions about creativity conditions between young research associates – at JAIST. The purpose of the survey was to find what aspects of knowledge creation processes are evaluated as either <i>most critical</i> or <i>most important</i> by responders.
 On this occasion, we tried also a new approach to interactive knowledge acquisition from complex data bases.

- 6. Tests, 2 A long questionnaire was prepared (J. Tian); it consisted of total of 48 questions, organized in five parts. ٠ The questions were of three types: > Assessment questions, assessing the situation at the university; the most critical questions of this type are those that correspond *worst* to a given reference profile. Importance questions, assessing importance of a given subject; the most important questions might be considered as those that correspond best to a reference profile. Controlling questions, testing the answers to the first two types by indirect questioning revealing student attitudes or asking for a detailed explanation. The responders were subdivided corresponding to: > The organizational structure of JAIST, three schools: of material science, of information science and of knowledge science; Their character: master students, doctoral students, research associates:
- > Their national origin: Japanese and foreign.

6. Tests, 3	
 All questions of first two types – assessment questions and importance questions – allowed five options of answers, variously called but signifying similar opinions: "very good – good – average – bad – very bad" or "very important – important – indifferent – not important – negatively important". Thus, answers to all questions of first two types can be evaluated on a common scale, as a percentage statistical distribution of answers VG – G – A – B – VB, while a differe wording of the answers would be appropriately interpreted. Some questions or scale of answers were reversed, stated negatively, for testing the concentration of responders, but this can be also taken into account just by reversing the scale. Special attention should be paid to: 	
 The worst evaluated assessment questions of the first type indicating some critical conditions for scientific creativity; The best evaluated importance questions of the second type, indicating most important issues in the opinion of responders. Thus, the problem might be posed as a ranking of histogram or probability distributions 	





 In eight worst evaluated consistently repeated into can count them as the <i>n</i> These are questions relaconcerning: 1) Because of language reaquestions with colleague 2) Easiness of sharing tacit 3) Critical feedback, questions 4) Organizing and planning 5) Preparing presentations 6) Designing and planning 7) Generating new ideas ar In the eight best evaluate the second (importance) of these changes, listed 1. Learning and training ho 	ons and suggestions in group research activities; for seminars and conferences; experiments; id research concepts. ed questions, the following questions of type were consistently, independently as most important : w to do experiments; the supervisor and colleagues;
	43

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6. Tests, 7
 Most of these results actually correspond to some elements of the three spirals of normal academic knowledge creation: Intersubjective EDIS (Enlightenment-Debate-Immersion-Selection) Spiral – items 2), 3) and 5); Experimental EEIS (Enlightenment-Experiment-Interpretation-Selection) Spiral – item 6); Hermeneutic EAIR (Enlightenment-Analysis-Immersion-Reflection) Spiral – item 7). However, they also stress the importance of another spiral of research planning: Roadmapping (I-System) Spiral – item 4). This conclusion is supported by the positive evaluation of the importance of other elements of these spirals in response to questions of the second type (1., 2., 3.) – and also by the answers to indirect questions of the third type. The question, however, is: how objective is such empirical support for the essential importance of the three spirals of normal academic knowledge creation contained in the Triple Helix and the Roadmapping Spiral?

6. Tests, 8


- It is just common sense that:
- reading scientific literature,
- ➤ debating,
- > experimenting,
- ➤ research planning
- are *normal* elements of academic research (*to falsify this, find a university that functions without them*).
- However, even a positive, as objective as possible empirical support from one research institution cannot prove that these elements are **essential for all universities;** many falsification attempts are needed to be reasonable sure of their importance, further research is necessary.
- Thus, other tests are intended; they might consists in an application of the full cycle of the *Nanatsudaki Model* in a research project; or performing similar questionnaire research in other research institutions.

6. Tests: conclusions
 The example of the evaluation of the results of the survey of conditions for scientific creativity shows that <i>the proposed method can be very useful for management,</i> as in the particular case it was found useful by university management: In identifying several issues of creativity that might be improved, e.g., by introducing new teaching courses; In detailed critical comments from individual responders. Other conclusion from this example is <i>a (naturally limited) empirical support for the essential importance of the four spirals</i>: <i>the Intersubjective EDIS Spiral,</i> <i>the Experimental EEIS Spiral,</i> <i>the Roadmapping (I-System) Spiral</i> of planning research processes. In general, this example shows that the use of <i>interactive knowledge acquisition</i> – that is, a multiple criteria formulation and reference profiles for knowledge acquisition from complex data sets - gives very promising results and should be applied more broadly.

7. Conclusions - general


- We commented on the emergence of knowledge sciences, including epistemology, knowledge engineering, management science with knowledge management, sociological (soft) systems science, technology management, and technological (hard) systems science.
- Many new micro-theories of knowledge creation for today and tomorrow emerged since 1990. All such micro-theories take into account the interplay of intuitive and emotional, tacit aspects of knowledge with rational and explicit aspects.
- There is a qualitative difference between group-oriented organizational processes of knowledge creation in industrial and market organizations and individual-oriented academic processes of knowledge creation; the latter can be described by a Triple Helix of academic knowledge creation.
- Combining both organizational and academic processes of knowledge creation is the prescriptive *Nanatsudaki* model of seven creative processes.
- The importance of diverse elements of these models was empirically supported by the results of a survey of creativity conditions in a Japanese research university, using multiple criteria decision making for *interactive knowledge acquisition* from complex data bases.






	1995			2005			
Rank	University	Amount (10 ⁸ yen)	% of total	University	Amount (10 ⁸ yen)	% of total	
1	U of Tokyo	125.5	13.6	U of Tokyo	201.2	11.7	
2	Kyoto U	72.7	7.9	Kyoto U	131.1	7.6	
3	Osaka U	61.3	6.6	Tohoku U	94.8	5.5	
4	Tohoku U	41.6	4.5	Osaka U	89.8	5.2	
5	Nagoya U	34.9	3.8	Nagoya U	64.6	3.8	
6	Kyushu U	30.0	3.3	Kyushu U	56.8	3.3	
7	Tokyo Inst. Tech	30.0	3.2	Hokkaido U	56.1	3.3	
8	Hokkaido U	28.5	3.1	Tokyo Inst. Tech	45.4	2.7	
9	U of Tsukuba	22.2	2.4	U of Tsukuba	30.2	1.8	
10	Hiroshima U	13.2	1.4	Riken	26.3	1.5	
11	Okayama U	9.5	1.0	Keio U	24.9	1.5	
12	Keio U	9.1	0.9	Kobe U	24.7	1.4	
Total		924.0	100		1714.4	100	

	academic institutions ranked by 200	All	Federal	% total	, State/loc	
Alls	source rank and university name	sources	gov't	Federal	gov't	Industr
1	Johns Hopkins U. incl. APL (private)	1,244	1,007	4.47	3	2
4	U. of Washington–Seattle	685	566	2.29	12	4
2	U. of Michigan, all campuses	780	517	2.09	17	3
8	Stanford U. (private)	603	484	2	4	3
2	U. of California–Los Angeles	849	421	1.7	67	3
9	U. of Pennsylvania (private)	565	416	1.68	2	2
6	U. of California–San Diego	647	400	1.62	24	2
3	U. of Wisconsin–Madison	721	396	1.6	41	1
23	Columbia U. (private)	438	386	1.56	2	
24	U. of Colorado, all campuses	437	378	1.53	8	1
6	U. of California–San Francisco	671	372	1.5	27	3






Over 80% of government funding for university R&D, about 75% of private funding for university R&D, and 70% of entrepreneurial activity

are concentrated in 7 population centers that account for about half Japan's population.

10 Nov. 2006

R. Kneller, JAIST Forum



Comment from the Director of the University-Industry Liaison Office of a major Canadian university:

"Canada has no large [pharmaceutical] companies. The only alternative to licensing our university's [biomedical] discoveries to US companies is to create our own startups and to help them grow. This is the only way to keep good jobs and value-added development in our region."

10 Nov. 2006


R. Kneller, JAIST Forum


But in Japan as a whole, the role of high technology startups is more limited than in the U.S.
As are their business prospects.


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
The most numerous and successful startups are in biomedicine, <u>but</u>

- Total employment in therapeutic-oriented ventures (~1500 in 113 cos., avg age 4 yrs) in 2005 was less than half that in US bio ventures <u>of</u> <u>equivalent age</u> in 1987 & 1998.
- Average employment per co. in 2005 about 1/3rd that in equivalent-age bio ventures in US.


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
R. Kneller, JAIST Forum


































Worlds of Knowledge and Democracy Is Civil Society a Daughter of Knowledge?

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Lecture delivered at the Japan Institute for Advanced Studies in Science and Technology November 2006 In a recent review in the *New York Review of Books* (November 18, 2004, p. 38), the molecular biologist Richard Lewontin maintains that "the knowledge required for political rationality, once available to the masses, is now in the possession of a specially educated elite, a situation that creates a series of tensions and contradictions in the operation of representative democracy." Lewontin's observations about the linkage between knowledge and democracy very well sum up the set of questions I want to raise in this lecture.

Although questions of the **unmediated rather than indirect** relations between knowledgeability and democracy are not a widely discussed set of issues in social science, a recent, hotly contested case from the United States to which I will briefly later shows that this issue is also a highly contentious *practical political issue* that is by no means settled.

However, if one extends one's perspective to what are mediated relations between knowledge, civil society and democratic regimes, one constantly encounters its tracks; for example, under the heading of cultural capital and political franchise, access to educational institutions and political interest, educational achievement and political participation, political convictions and occupational status, and so on. Yet, I will restrict my observations to the more or less **immediate** linkage between knowledgeability and democratic conduct.

I will begin with a rather broad set of questions and claims: As Max Horkheimer emphasized -- in contrast to Karl Marx -- justice or equity and freedom do not mutually support each other. Does this **also** apply to democracy and knowledge? Or is knowledge a democratizer? Is the progress of knowledge, especially rapid advances a burden on democracy, civil society and the capacity of the individual to assert her will? And if there is a contradiction between knowledge and democratic processes, is this a **new** development or is the advance of liberal democracies codetermined by the joint forces of knowledge and democratic political conduct enabling one to claim that civil society if not democracy is the daughter of knowledge?

Knowledge has not only a performative or doing function (**=power**) it also has distributive or holding function (**=property**) in modern societies. In this contribution, I shall focus on the latter.

Overview

The theme I would like to explore in this presentation concern the multiple linkages between civil society, governance, and democracy. I will place this general question into the context of whether the presence and the nature of these linkages are co-determined by a growing knowledgeability of modern actors -- stressing growing chances of reflexive cooperation in civil society organizations, social movements and perhaps a growing influence of larger segments of society on democratic regimes as the result of actor's improved knowledgeability.

However, my specific purpose has to be more modest. Access to and the command of knowledge is stratified. I will explore three of these barriers and hurdles of access to knowledge and ask: (1) Is it possible to reconcile expertise and civil society, (2) it is conceivable to reconcile civil society and knowledge as a private good and (3) how dear (expensive) should knowledge be and what is the appropriate role of the state in providing knowledge? Each of the terms I just introduced in my brief overview is an essentrially **contested** concept. I will try to clarify next how **I plan** to use these concepts, especially the notion of knowledge.

The Terms

Knowledge may be defined as a *capacity for action*. The use of the term "knowledge" as a capacity for action is derived from Francis Bacon's famous observation that knowledge is power. Bacon suggests that knowledge derives its utility from its capacity to set something in motion.

I refer to *civil society* not in its traditional sense as political society or the state but as the arena of active citizens interposed between the state and the intimate forms of life.

The possession of knowledge enhances **agency**. At the heart of civil society is agency. Agency is the ability of citizens to set goals, develop commitments, pursue values – and succeed in realizing them. Valuing agency is at the heart of subsidiary or self-government.

In asking about the differential command of knowledge of actors in modern societies, I am exploring -- reformulating the issue of differential access to knowledge – as the question of mastering one's own life with the aid of the resource knowledge.

Introduction

There are of course a large number of more or less rival hypotheses that refer to the reasons for the emergence and persistence of democratic regimes and the strength of civil societies within such social systems; for example, Francis Fukuyama explicates his thesis about the end of

Nico Stehr

competing ideologies in the last century by stressing, "there are fundamental economic and political imperatives pushing history in one direction, towards greater democracy." But other scholars argue that democracies can take a hold in countries that are poor and that democracy therefore does not follow economic development. But as claims for the war in Iraq have shown, democracy is also expected to follow from the barrel of guns.

In contrast to these modern claims, John Stuart Mill, in *The Spirit of the Age* (1831), published after his return to England from France, affirms his conviction that the **intellectual accomplishments** of his own age make social progress inevitable. But progress in the improvement of social conditions is not, Mill argues, the outcome of an "increase in wisdom" or of the collective accomplishments of science. It is rather linked to a **general diffusion of knowledge**.

Mill's observations in the mid-nineteenth century, a period he regarded as an age of moral and political transition, and in particular his expectation that increased individual choice (and hence emancipation from "custom") will result from a broad diffusion of knowledge and education, strongly resonates with the notion of present-day society -- the social structure that is emerging as industrial society gives way -- as a **knowledge society**.

John Stuart Mill was a great admirer of the classic study of American Society by Alexis de Tocqueville; as a matter of fact, Mill wrote a review of *Democracy in America* (1835-40) that was published almost at the same time as his *The Spirit of the Age*. But there are decisive differences between between Mill and de Tocqueville in their judgment of democracy, especially of the role of knowledge of its citizens for and in democratic regimes.

De Tocqueville closes his observations about American society by observing that the educational attainment of its citizens is an influential force in the maintaining democracy in America. While Mills has considerable confidence in the independent capacity of enlightenment, education and knowledge and intellectual skills as the **necessary** condition for the strength of democratic regimes, for De Tocqueville knowledge is the **sufficient** condition for democracy.

From Mills assumption it follows that intellectuals and scientists play a significant political role in democracies; in the case of De Tocqueville, it is the ordinary citizen and his or her immediate political practice that strengthens democratic political systems. Without taking side abut the specifics of the dispute between de Tocquevielle and Mill, I generally concur with thewir genral observation about the importance social role of knowledge for democracy.

I therefore reject the microphysics of power as elaborated Foucault. As is well known, in his genealogical work, Foucault describes the onesided shaping of the individual by scientific disciplines such as penology, psychoanalysis etc. and the enormous, micromanaged power of regimentation and measurement in major social institutions. The observations by Foucault are based on a view of knowledge that assign too power to knowledge or the agencies in which it is embedded. Foucault underestimates the malleability of knowledge, the extent to whoich knowledge is convtested and capacity of individuals and civil society organizations to deply knowledge in order to **resist**, **oppose** and **restrain** major social institions in society.

There are various societal restraints that affect the wide dissimination of knowledge in society and therefore hinder the effective role of knowledge for democracy. I will refer to three barriesr under the heading of the following questions: (1) it is possible to reconcile democracy and expertise, (2) it is possible to reconcile democracy and knowledge as property and (3) it is possible to reconcile democracy and the knowledge divide?

Reconciling democtacy and expertisec

Many observers are convinced that the gap between expertise, that is, powerful agencies that harbor expert knowledge and the knowledge of laypersons in modern societies have dramatically and irreversible widened. On the other hand, it is evident that the social deference, the unquestioned respect and the taken-for-granted authority based on knowledge of the major professions (teachers, doctors, lawyers) at least im modern Western society has declined since at least the 1960s. Nonetheless, there is still widespread support for the "scientistic" perspective of nature of knowledge claims, namely that knowledge is universal and universally useful. The acceptance of a scientistic conception probably enhances the power of those who are seen as representing authoritative scientific knowledge.

Yet, the rising tempo with which knowledge is added has the opposite effect, instead of enhancing the universality of knowledge, a massive cleavage between those who directly participate in the process of knowledge production and those who are not part of the same process can be noted. The same observers therefore argue for the presence of a deficit model among different publics and stress the serious consequences the asymmetry between expert knowledge and the public has for the nature of civil society.

I will describe the deficit model in somewhat greater detail: The ease with which one delegates, of course aside from one's own specialty, judgment to the expert is seen to have hardened in all social institutions in modern society, not only in science. At the same time, it is widely assumed, for example, in the field of the "public understanding of science" that scientific illiteracy decreases the public's democratic capacities.

As a result, the "loss of contact" between science and the public emerges as one of the salient attribute of the interrelation between specialized knowledge and society. Large segments of the public have become disenfranchised and disabled from effective involvement in democratic processes that increasingly require a certain level of scientific literacy. This loss of contact is not only the result of a growing cognitive distance between science and everyday knowledge; it is also affected by the ever increasing speed of knowledge expansion based on a growing division of labor in science and by the deployment of knowledge as a productive capacity. The **decreasing** cognitive proximity increases the political distance from science, for example by restricting public reflection on both anticipated and unanticipated transformations of social and cultural realities resulting from the application of new knowledge. The scientific community shares responsibility for this diminishing intellectual proximity, since the preferred self-image of science as a consensual, even monolithic and monologic, enterprise is increasingly in conflict with both its public role and its own internal struggles about research priorities, as well as the generation of data and their interpretation.

Nico Stehr

However, on political and moral grounds many groups, constituencies and institutions must be consulted before decisions are made about issues that affect the regulation of knowledge and indirectly the development of science and technology. It would be misleading to think that the distance from and the loss of contact with science, or the considerable scientific illiteracy in modern societies, is somehow a 'potentially fatal flaw in the self-conception of the people today' (as Gerald Holton suggests) and/or signals the possibility of a dramatic collapse in public support for science.

It is more accurate to speak of a state of precarious balance affecting the autonomy and dependence of science in modern society. A loss of close intellectual contact between science and the public is perfectly compatible with both a diffuse support for science in modern society and an assent to legal and political efforts to control the impact of science and technology. In another sense, however, the loss of cognitive contact is almost irrelevant, and highly controversial; for example, when 'contact' is meant to refer to **close cognitive proximity** as a prerequisite of public participation in decisions affecting scientific and technological knowledge. Such a claim is practically meaningless because it almost requires public engagement in science-in-progress.

In arriving at judgment about expertise and civil society, one needs to take specific contexts into account The conditions under which different publics may make sense of specialized knowledge vary considerably. Rather than treating the relations between expertise and the public as a series of relations that involve individual, isolated actors, we need to think of the interaction between expertise and the public as mediated by cultural identities and the resourcefulness of civil society organizations reconstructing science and technology in distinct ways.

Moreover, without some element of trust exhibited by ordinary members towards experts, expertise would vanish. Nonetheless, experts today are constantly involved in a remarkable number of controversies. The growing policy field of setting limits to the presence of certain ingredients in foodstuffs, of safety regulations, risk management and the control of hazards has had the side effect of ruining the reputation of experts. As long as an issue remains a contested matter, especially a publicly contentious matter, the power and influence of experts and counter-experts is limited; once a decision has been made and a question settled, the authority of experts becomes almost uncontested as well. The work required to transform a contested matter into an uncontested issue is linked to the ability of experts to mobilize social and cultural resources in **relevant** contexts.

From the point of view of the scientific community, the lack of cognitive proximity to the general public has advantages and disadvantages. The loss of contact between science and the public can perhaps explain, at least in part, why the scientific community, in view of its attractiveness and usefulness for corporations, the military and the state, has been able to preserve a considerable degree of intellectual autonomy. Such autonomy, however, is contingent on a host of factors within and without the scientific community. The loss of contact is a resource for the scientific community. It signals a symbolic detachment and independence that can be translated into an asset vis-à-vis the state and other societal agencies. Science becomes an authoritative voice in policy matters; or it represents, in ideological and material struggles with

Nico Stehr

other political systems, the openness of society. But the cognitive distance also limits the immediate effectiveness of the "voice of science" in civil society organizations as well as in policy matters, and extensive autonomy and independence of science may result in an excessive celebration of "normal" scientific activity and lead to a lack of innovativeness.

Reconciling democracy and knowledge as property

In testimony before the U.S. Congress more than a century ago, John Powell, a pioneer in the field of the earth sciences, put his finger on one of the most intriguing features of knowledge, namely "the possession of property is exclusive; possession of knowledge is not exclusive". In spite of Powell's thesis, some forms of knowledge are exclusive and become private goods as the result of legal restraints such as patents or copyright restriction attached to knowledge.

Whether knowledge is treated as a public or private good has many noteworthy consequences; for example, it is most likely incremental or new knowledge that is protected. In the context of economic systems but also science, this raises a serious dilemma: The basis of the growth of knowledge is knowledge. If knowledge is protected the growth of knowledge is hampered. But if knowledge is not protected, economist will argue, the incentive to invest in new knowledge disappears; monopoly rights are essential for the growth of knowledge and inventions.

In contrast to incremental knowledge, the general mundane and routinized stock of knowledge consists mostly of knowledge that is nonrival as well as non-excludable, that is, these forms of knowledge may very well constitute public goods. Scientific knowledge constitutes one of the most important conditions for the possibility of modernization in the sense of a persistent extension and enlargement of social and economic action that science and not any social system in modern society generates.

I do not want to discuss the contentious issue of trade-offs that may exist between assigning proprietary rights to knowledge and the gains in the overall welfare of society or the trade-offs between treating knowledge as a public good and the loss of welfare for those that cannot reap the benefits from their inventions and discoveries.

Economists, legal scholars and major international organizations such as the World Bank make the case that knowledge must be a (global) public asset. From an economic viewpoint this means that knowledge should lack the characteristics, otherwise typical for economic assets, namely rivalry and excludability. That some forms of knowledge are public goods **is least likely** the case for additional, that is, new knowledge. And it is additional knowledge that turns a profit.

Thus, the age-old dilemma whether property generates power and thereby fashions human relations or whether it is the other way around continues to be played out even in knowledge societies.

Reconciling democracy and the knowledge divide?

For almost a decade, the State of New York and the City of New York are embroiled in a legal battle over whether the state is paying its fair share toward New York City's public school system. The contested issue is less about money although in the end it also is about money, it is about the minimal obligation governments have to educate its children. The dispute revolves around the intriguing question what exactly is meant by the constitutional promise of a "sound, basic education" for the children in the state.

The very first sentence in the June 2003 decision of the appeals court affirms, "we begin (our ruling) with a unanimous recognition of the importance of education in our democracy. The fundamental value of education is embedded in the Education Article of the New York State constitution by this simple sentence: "The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this state may be educated."

The plaintiffs of course contend that the State fails to afford New York City's public schoolchildren the educational opportunity guaranteed by the constitution. But what exactly is the constitutional human right to education, what is a sound basic education? State schools, a previous court ruling suggested, are "obligated by the state Constitution to do nothing more than prepare students for low-level-jobs, for serving on a jury and for reading campaign literature, that is the equivalent of an eighth- or ninthgrade education. And in this respect, New York City, however troubled its schools, met that standard, however limited that standard. The court decision did not please the plaintiffs and they appealed. A subsequent 2003 decision of the Court of Appeals held that as one judge put it, "a high school education is now all but indispensable."

The lengthy New York court cases were mainly about state responsibilities toward the *collectivity* of children, it does not address its responsibility toward individual pupils, especially in as much as such responsibilities may arise from what I would call the "knowledge divide." Thus, in stark contrast to the ruling of the New York Appeal Court, courts in other US jurisdictions have tackled the "knowledge divide". The New Jersey Supreme Court for example takes the view that state schools should be responsible for remedying educational deficits that might have their roots in larger problems, such as social inequality, ethnic or family backgrounds.

Public policies that follow from these different approaches are significant. In the latter case, redistribution of property-tax is in order and affirmative actions programs are justified while in the case of the former approach enormous inequalities in outcome of schooling standards are acceptable.

Concluding remarks

My presentation concentrated on questions concerned with how to gain knowledge in modern society and less on what to do with it. That is the topic of another lecture. The basic claim for the moment however is that democratization in modern societies as knowledge societies increasingly extend to the *democratization and negotiation of knowledge claims*.

I assume that scientific knowledge is much more malleable and accessible than is suggested in the classical perspective of the relations between science and society. The new sociology of scientific knowledge has familiarized us with the perspective that the production of scientific knowledge is in many ways very similar to other social practices. The boundaries between expertise and everyday knowledge are much less fixed and robust than is often surmised, especially in observations that lament about a growing distance between expert knowledge and the public's knowledge. Knowledgeability has social externationalities through the production a more participatory democracy or citizenship from which civil society organizations benefit most.

This produces particular challenges, for example, in terms of access to knowledge but also in the form of new modes of participation. And here civil society organizations will be challenged.

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
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Theoretical Awareness III

Advantages:


- clarity about theoretical assumptions
- strengths and weaknesses of different approaches better understood
- · promotes learning
- a pluralist approach to intervention
- further enriching of the field
- disciplinary partnership





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






























Seeking Good

Every sort of expert knowledge and every inquiry, and similarly every action and undertaking, seems to seek some good. Because of that, people are right to affirm that the good is 'that which all things seek'.

(Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics)


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
Why do we create knowledge?: A story of Honda

Honda was trying to develop the CVCC engine, which had lower emission and higher fuel efficiency. Souichiro Honda, the founder and then CEO of Honda one day told his engineers that the engine would finally give Honda the opportunity to beat Big 3.


The engineers looked at Mr. Honda, and said, "Please, don't say such a thing. We are not doing this to beat other guys. We are doing this for our children."


Mr. Honda was ashamed of himself, and said that he realized that he had become too old, and decided to retire.




































"Paradox is a way of life at Canon....Facing a paradox, we embrace it and go ahead coping with it. We are constantly on the move."


-- Fujio Mitarai, President and CEO


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
Strategy as Distributed Phronesis: A Case of Seven-Eleven Japan

(audio-visual media)

Judging what is Good

Our competitors are neither other companies nor other stores, but our customers' needs and wants. Our absolute value is to answer the fundamental questions of "what does the customer want?"

-Toshifumi Suzuki, CEO, Seven-Eleven Japan






Hypothesis Building

The concept of opportunity loss from unrealized sales is invisible and difficult to grasp since it is buried In tacit insights gained in particular context for each store. Rather than written manuals, each employee is requested to think and act on his/her subjective insights into the local market accumulated through daily face-to-face interactions with customers.

Such subjective insights in particular contexts are objectified through the process of hypothesis building and testing. It is not good if you just see a tree, not a forest. Of course you have to see the particular tree. But you have see to the entire forest as well as the trees.

-Toshifumi Suzuki, CEO, Seven-Eleven Japan

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A Knowledge-Based Firm is...

A company who practices the idealistic pragmatism which synthesizes;

Ontology: How to be -"For what do we live?": the vision to the future and the commitment to it. Epistemology: How to know

-"What is the truth?": the SECI spiral which synthesizes objective and subjective views.

Creation: How one can change itself and the environment

Management is viewed as "a way of life" rather than a tool to make money.

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