<I>Attempt </I>to Understand Wittgenstein's Picture = Theory of the Logical Proposition

From: Subject: Attempt to Understand Wittgenstein's Picture Theory of the Logical Proposition Date: Sat, 5 Oct 2002 13:11:45 +0900 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/related; type="text/html"; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_004C_01C26C70.C1544EA0" X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2600.0000 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_004C_01C26C70.C1544EA0 Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Location: http://www.ul.ie/~philos/vol2/cashell.html <I>Attempt </I>to Understand Wittgenstein's Picture = Theory of the Logical Proposition

ATTEMPT TO UNDERSTAND = WITTGENSTEIN'S=20 PICTURE THEORY OF THE PROPOSITION =20

Kieran=20 = Cashell

=20

3D"Ludwig =20

Ludwig Wittgenstein

I use the words you taught me. If they don't mean = anything any=20 more, teach me others. Or let me be silent. [Pause.]

Samuel Beckett, Endgame. ¹=20

=20

Let us speak firstly of the attempt. Two senses of "Attempt to = understand=20 Wittgenstein's Picture Theory" can be indicated. On the one hand, = functioning in=20 its proper (intensional) context - as a title - it refers reflexively to = the=20 content of this essay. "Attempt", in this sense signifies the attempt = made here=20 tonight concerning Wittgenstein. On the other hand, one can = perhaps=20 predicate a certain extra-contextual, quasi-transcendent sense of = "Attempt".=20 Remove the scare-quotes, append an exclamation mark: Attempt to = understand=20 Wittgenstein's picture theory! becomes a didactic imperative to = make=20 the attempt to understand the picture theory.=20

Let us speak therefore of the attempt. ²=20

Thinking the attempt involves a caveat that at this stage gives us = pause:=20 namely, the attempt to understand involves a certain risk. Approaching = the limit=20 of understanding - this risk can be identified as the risk of failure. = It means=20 no more than that any attempt to understand must remain an attempt. What = I seek=20 tonight is nothing less than the attempt to understand the = attempt.=20
Intensifying the attempt in this way gives it a performative = structure.=20 It attests to the refusal to take vicarious gratification in the = fulfilment of=20 an understanding that would masquerade as completion, as continuity, as=20 consistency, as coherence.=20

The attempt signifies that something (is) taking place.=20

If the attempt is a project, what do we aim at? Hypothetically, = can we=20 speak of the horizon of an attempt? Eyeing an uncertain destination, our = problematic snakes detour-wise across a faulty landscape, toward a kind = of=20 Zenonian non-place. This locus is not the place of understanding; it is = not a=20 discursive destination; having always already taken place, discourse = takes (its)=20 place somewhere inside the communicative trajectory: past the departure = and=20 short of the destination. A detour will take us outside that trajectory; = it will=20 deposit a broken inclination: this is the movement of discourse = itself.=20

Discourse - all that can be said - shows itself in the = detour of=20 the attempt.=20

And this is what is to be understood.

=

Negative theology reminds us that every attempt to describe God = adequately=20 in communicative terms debases God to the level of ordinary reason, and = so=20 denigrates his absolute Otherness. The utterly hopeless attempt to = understand=20 God can only be understanding that we cannot understand God. Leading us = to the=20 point of despair, the following proposition: anything said concerning = God is=20 inadequate, turns back on itself recursively in the edifying recognition = that -=20 except for the following admission - anything said concerning God = is=20 inadequate.=20

This scepticism, this concession of defeat, is but a recognition = of the=20 fragility of our "transcendental" epistemological instrumentation. But = the=20 paradox of this scepticism is that there, amid the fault-lines that mar = and=20 undermine epistemic certainty, some objective (un)certain presence = appears;=20 there, stuck in the aporia, something presences. Abdicating to = the limits=20 of knowledge - there, there is an access - there there = opens a way=20 through the aporiai of discourse.=20

Apropos of Kierkegaard, Louis Mackey demonstrates that in the = aftermath of=20 a scepticism more sceptical than counterfeit Cartesian scepticism, a = strange=20 shape-taking emerges. 'Wherever all human possibilities - aesthetic,=20 intellectual, moral - are exhausted, there God is present. =85 human = attempts to=20 make contact with God must be frustrated before God himself can break = through'=20 (1967; 76).=20

To speak unscientifically: alienated from something = incommensurable to my=20 cognitive categories - I become aware of something necessarily absent = from my=20 limited world. And yet it is in this moment - that is, in the moment I = become=20 aware of the limits of my world - I glimpse evanescent possibilities in = the mesh=20 of the profanely factual. In the negative delimitation, a gestural = relation is=20 maintained with the ambiguous region outside the boundaries of this = cartography.=20 In other words: the excluded necessarily (retributively - Anaximander) = informs=20 discourse. Negative form - what Kierkegaard might have called the = 'shadowgraphy'=20 of limits - involves an internal movement through to what lies beyond = its=20 limits. Installing a corruptive heterogeneity into Parmenidean identity, = that=20 which is limited maintains an ostensive relation with the other side of = its=20 limit. And yet contra Hegel's polemic against Kant, the transconceptual, = being=20 wholly indeterminate, is not just void.=20

Scepticism: a presence denied its presence and in this denial = indicated,=20 unsaid and in this unsaying said, unshown and shown, unseen and seen; = and this=20 counterplay of speaking and silence, of exhalation and inhalation, of = positing=20 and de-positing is the rhythm of Wittgenstein's Tractatus=20 Logico-Philosophicus.

III

If we ingenuously accept Wittgenstein's own insistent claim that = the=20 overriding theme of the Tractatus is ethical, then the = ineluctable=20 conclusion of that text (as its 'final imperative' ³=20 demonstrates) is that the axiological - the philosophy of values as = opposed to=20 facts - is sticto sensu ineffable. Candidly: the Tractatus = says=20 (NB this "says") that in order to do justice to the ethical we must=20 (imperatively) observe a moratorium - that is, recognise a strict regime = of=20 ineffability - regarding value judgements.=20

It is this conclusion that leads Albert W. Levi (1978-9; 71), = among others=20 to hypothesise that the Tractatus represents a picture of = traditional=20 metaphysical dualism. Backing up his claim, Levi quotes Wittgenstein's = famous=20 1919 letter to Ludwig Von Ficker (here I reproduce the pertinent passage = of this=20 letter in full from Ray Monk's biography, Wittgenstein, the Duty of=20 Genius (1990)):
=20

I wanted to write that my work consisted of two parts: of = the=20 one which is here, and of everything [note this "everything", in a = sense,=20 everything hangs on this "everything"] which I have not = written. And=20 precisely this second part is the important one. For the Ethical is = delimited=20 from within, as it were, by my book; and I'm convinced that = strictly=20 speaking, it can ONLY be delimited in this way. ⁴ = In brief,=20 I think: All of that which many are babbling about today, I have = delved in my=20 book by remaining silent about it. (in Monk: 1990; = 178)

Levi=20 concludes that Wittgensteinian reticence concerning the semantic = 'displacement'=20 of the axiological, promotes the radical exclusion of a transcendental=20 value-domain from the empirical world; this implies (necessarily) a = coterminous=20 affirmation of the contingent status of the fact-world as reflected in=20 linguistic sense (or more precisely, logical form). This strategy = removes the=20 moral beyond the legislation of rational (ad hominem) judgement = (that is,=20 it renders it outside and unanswerable to the categorical imperative) = (73).=20

6.421 It is clear that = ethics=20 cannot be expressed.=20

Ethics is = transcendental.=20

(Ethics and aesthetics = are=20 one.)=20

6.423 Of the will as = the=20 subject of the ethical we cannot speak.=20

Levi interprets this relativist 'strategy' with reference to = apparently=20 "incontrovertible" "facts" excised from Wittgenstein's biography. Thus, = he=20 claims (most bewitchingly) that Wittgenstein's ethical system=20 (consolidated in the doctrine of 'moral inexpressibility' expounded in=20 propositions 6.4 to 7 of the Tractatus) is associated with his = haunted,=20 self-deprecatory, and (ultimately) guilty conscience regarding his=20 (homo)sexuality.=20

Granted, propositions 6.4 to 7 appear to ratify Levi's hypothesis; = language cannot subsume anything of higher value than itself; the domain = proper=20 to the ethical is incommensurable to the language that we use to = communicate=20 contingent facts (or intentional objects) (6.42). And if read pari = passu=20 with Wittgenstein's tortured and self-deprecatory letters ⁵ = (which Levi=20 believes simply must relate to his guilty homosexuality) = his=20 hypothesis is admittedly enticing in a lurid, sleazy, tabloid = way.=20 However, interpreted in the light of my opening remarks, the tractarian=20 inexpressibility thesis becomes perhaps more philosophically (even=20 theologically) subtle than the sealed hermeneutic envelope of the Levian = adaequatio can admit.=20

How?
In the following way.=20

Attempts to render the valuable in a suitable philosophic or = scientific=20 metalanguage surrogate the transcendent significance, the denial of = which is the=20 condition of its possibility. Thus (I argue) it is misleading to = attribute a=20 commitment to metaphysical dualism (ontological, axiological or = otherwise) to=20 early Wittgenstein, even if the geminate structure of the=20 Tractatus itself appears to reflect this "two-worldism". The = tractarian=20 rejection of the translation of ethical values to significant speech is = not an=20 abstract negation. Rather it is a negation that conserves what it = annuls; and=20 thus it follows the (dia)logic of the negation characteristic of = consciousness,=20 i.e. the negating gesture that "casts away"and that yet maintains an = ostentive=20 relation with what it negates on a higher level. It is this = negation=20 (illustrated perspicuously in thesis 6.54 in terms of a certain=20 climbed-and-thrown-away ladder) itself that intimates the ethical = content=20 of the Tractatus; and the task of that text is to show = that the=20 gesture of rejection itself provides its eliminated substance: ⁶ = the content=20 expunged through the parsimony of form returns like the spectre of "the=20 repressed" to haunt the Tractatus.=20

(Negative theology shows that it is only through the performative = denial=20 per se that true transcendent, metaphysical experiences become = possible -=20 denial is their mode of actualisation [actualitas,=20 entelechia].)=20

'There is indeed the inexpressible', Wittgenstein writes, 'This = shows=20 itself; it is the mystical [es ist das Mystische]' (6.522, my = emphasis).=20 Traditional philosophy errs in its attempt to reduce das = Mystische to=20 language. It is guilty of misunderstanding the logic of language in ways = foundationally damaging to itself. Fundamentalontologie and = Naturalistic=20 ethics (for example) violate the rules of logic by attempting to make = language=20 do something it cannot do: namely, to represent metaphysical, = transcendental or=20 existential ("Subjective") experiences adequately in intentional = ("objective")=20 or scientifically accountable propositions. Such linguistic attempts to=20 hypostatise (or reify) the metaphysical experience, as Wittgenstein says = in the=20 ante-penultimate proposition of the Tractatus, cannot signify; = that is,=20 the ambiguous signs of such language cannot do the work of hypostasis = demanded=20 of them. (Conversely, the Tractatus also shows that the = positivist=20 affirmation of the irrelevance of metaphysical, religious and aesthetic = values=20 from the episteme of philosophy is a facile and precipitate gambit.) =

Yet again we recognise the gesture of negative theology in the = tractarian=20 delimitation of what can be communicated without ambiguity in language=20 and in the necessity of silence concerning das Mystische.=20 Wittgenstein maintains (in the Hegelian sense, and so: relieves) = a=20 relation to the meaningful aspects of life: those aspects that give form = to the=20 intuitive content of life and substantiate it - such as responsibility, = decision=20 and choice, the relation to the absolute, that wonder concerning the why = of=20 Being (Thaumazein), and simple indwelling with the self. ⁷ = Eliminated=20 from the general semantic, these forms of life are yet conserved = under=20 erasure (to use Derrida's term: sous rature⁸) = in=20 Wittgenstein's Tractatus. And yet far from avoiding the issue of = the=20 transcendental (what is common a priori yet cuts across all = particular,=20 contingent instances), the Tractatus recognises the aporia = that we=20 deny the transcendent only to represent it more clearly and = unequivocally. In=20 other words, we eliminate speaking of it in order to do justice to = it.=20

The sentence: we admit the derelict inadequacy of our attempts to = know the=20 transcendent, paradoxically represents a fragment - a splinter = (Splitter)=20 - of adequate knowledge. Thus, in renouncing the possibility of a = positive=20 description of the metaphysical - through rejecting the reduction of=20 transcendental possibility to positive atoms of language - a movement = (as in a=20 transport) of the radically transcendent takes place.=20

        4.114 It [philosophy] = should=20 limit the thinkable and thereby the=20
        unthinkable.=20
        It should limit = the=20 unthinkable from within through the thinkable.=20

4.115 It [philosophy] = will mean=20 the unspeakable by clearly displaying the speakable.=20

Reminiscent of the negative gesture, the meaning of the = Tractatus=20 is absent in that text. I deliberately use that paradoxical locution to=20 demonstrate that what is excluded from the text is yet somehow = still=20 there.=20

It is absent, and in this absence, present.=20

Ineffability becomes the condition of possibility of (what I have = termed,=20 inadequately) "transcendent experiences". Attempts to express and = adequately=20 represent such experiences in language, therefore subsuming them in = reflective=20 concepts, founder against the limits of a hermetic conceptual economy. = In other=20 words: we tie ourselves in cognitive knots. For Wittgenstein, the = philosophic=20 performance is a matter of untangling those cognitive knots.=20

And yet.=20

In cataloguing the limitations of understanding, a certain = negative shape=20 emerges beyond the outer edges of discourse: the de facto absence = of=20 positive metaphysical facts in the world is yet a mark of their shadowed = presence.=20

Let us therefore begin, with nimble fingers, to untangle some = cognitive=20 knots; let us face (up to) the attempt; let us await the phenomenal = presence of=20 das Mystische.=20

Part 2
=20

The Picture Theory of the Proposition=20

Ludwig Wittgenstein, supervising the searchlight of a captured = Russian=20 ship silently adrift on the Vistula in 1914, ⁹ = was=20 thinking about the mysteries of logic. And his quarry - to disclose the = general,=20 universal form of the proposition, that to which all empirical = propositions of=20 language (however complex) conform - would, he believed, solve at last = those=20 logical spectres haunting him since Cambridge, and which he alone, = heroically,=20 struggled to exorcise in Norway the year before.=20

During the first months of World War One he was working on the = analysis of=20 complex sentences into symbolic components; he believed that empirical = language,=20 if reduced to its elementary logical parts, could be shown to correspond = to the=20 irreducible (atomic) components that - taken in their totality - = constitute=20 reality. The direction of his thought was leading toward the conviction = that=20 only painstaking analysis could show the shared relational form = of=20 elementary proposition and associated portion of reality. In sum: if a=20 proto-sign was discovered to represent the universal form of the general = proposition, then such a sign would somehow also demonstrate the logical = structure underlying language: that which enables language to describe = (or at=20 least give the appearance of logical correspondence with) a reality = apparently=20 indifferent to our description of it.=20

It was during his nocturnal supervision on the Vistula that he = came to the=20 conclusion that the relational form (logos) co-ordinating = thought,=20 language and the world was pictorial in nature. Prima facie, this = says no=20 more than that we picture facts to ourselves (2.1). Later the story was = told=20 how, while serving on the Eastern front, Wittgenstein read a report of a = Parisian court case in which a model was used by witnesses to exhibit = evidential=20 facts (G.H. von Wright in Monk: 1990; 117).=20

No apocalyptic sign, or revelatory seal, merely the = straightforward=20 reconstruction of an accident used routinely in evidence: nevertheless = it struck=20 Wittgenstein (embroiled in his problematic) with the force of an=20 epiphany.

Wittgenstein gradually became convinced that the ability to = represent a=20 positive fact through modelling it in its absence, thereby=20 retaining and communicating its sense (inner logical form), = contained the=20 key to the general form of the proposition (logos). That an = empirical=20 chain of events can be modelled with ersatz objects standing in for the=20 disposition of things in an objective (but absent, past, possible) = event; that=20 the truth of the event - "is this how it really happened?" - can thus be = ascertained, gives crucial insight into how world, thought and language = are=20 logically co-structured.=20

Wittgenstein's notebook entry of 29 September 1914, catalogues the = genesis=20 of the idea that determines our attempt tonight:=20

        The general concept of = the=20 proposition carries with it a quite general concept of the=20
        co-ordination of = proposition=20 and situation. The solution to all my questions must be=20
        extremely simple.=20

        In the proposition a = world is=20 as it were put together experimentally. (As when in the=20
        law-court in Paris a = motor-car=20 accident is represented by means of dolls etc.) This=20
        must yield the nature = of truth=20 straight away (if I were not blind) =85 [there follows a=20
        drawing of two figures = fencing] =85 'A is fencing with B'. The proposition in picture=20
        writing can be true or = false.=20 It has a sense independent of its truth or falsehood. It=20
        must be possible to=20 demonstrate everything essential by considering this case.=20
        (Wittgenstein, in = Kenny: 1973;=20 53)=20

This, what we now recognise as "the picture theory of the logical=20 proposition", was initially called 'The Picture Theory of Logical = Portrayal'=20 (Monk: 1990; 118); at its most skeletal, it is a description of our = relationship=20 with the world. And that that relationship is mediated, in the = Hegelian=20 sense, by language - that it is pictorial in nature - demonstrates that = thought=20 frames cells of reality (facts) in pictures; it demonstrates that = language=20 represents this depicting activity: we explain the world to ourselves by = depicting it in language.=20

With the discovery that we explain reality to ourselves by = picturing it,=20 Wittgenstein believed he had discovered the solution to the problem = intimated=20 above, the problem of logical form.

III

Wittgenstein's Tractatus begins with a precise and exiguous = description of the world. Thesis 1.1 distinguishes between a fact and an = object=20 and identifies the world as the totality (Gesamtheit) of = facts.=20

Why does Wittgenstein draw a distinction between a fact and an = object?=20 What is the distinction?=20

The answer is straightforward: empirical reality arranges itself = into=20 discrete facts - an indigenous potentiality to relate itself to other = things,=20 thus taking (its) place in the structure of a discrete fact represents = the=20 object's or thing's essential logical form (that without which it = would=20 not be itself); this potentiality is further defined as the 'internal = property'=20 of the object (Gegenstand) or thing (Ding).=20

Containing immanently all possible combinations with other = objects, the=20 given object virtually presents all other objects and hence=20 virtually presents all potential states of affairs = (groups) in=20 which it can appear as a functional element. Wahl: 'These formal or = internal=20 properties of an object concern the range of its occurrences in atomic = facts=20 (Sachverhalten), the possibility of combining with other objects = in a=20 certain way'. ¹⁰=20

2.0123 If I know an = object,=20 then I also know all the possibilities of its occurrence in=20
atomic facts.=20

(Every such possibility = must=20 lie in the nature of the object.)=20

A new possibility = cannot=20 subsequently be found.=20

2.01231 In order to = know an=20 object, I must know not its external but all its internal=20
qualities.=20

2.014 Objects contain = the=20 possibility of all states of affairs.=20

2.0141 The possibility = of its=20 occurrence in atomic facts is the form of the object.=20

We could say that - in the tractarian account - the object / thing = qua component of facts, wears its internal properties (potential = to=20 become a structural component of a possible fact) inscribed on it like = the=20 brush-stokes congealed on the surface of things in a painting.=20

A discrete fact is therefore essentially composite. It has a = general form:=20 it is a Gestalt figure. ¹¹ = The=20 logical form of objects is such that we perceive configurations = of=20 objects in contrast to an isolated object, quarantined from its context = of=20 interrelations. That is to say, the logical form of perception is such = that we=20 perceive a morphological configuration of things as a single shape or = form. In=20 the Tractatus the notion of a unique, solitary object is a = logical=20 fallacy; thus "the thing" presents virtually, immanently, all = possible=20 configurations (or 'concatenations') that it can compose itself within = or become=20 a structural part of. And thus the simple or atomic fact is the = fundamental=20 ontological quantum of the tractarian cosmos.
Thesis 2.04 = defines the=20 world as the entire aggregation (Geshamtheit) of such existent = (or=20 subsistent: bestehen) simple facts. (The totality of atomic = states of=20 affairs that do exist, as opposed to those that do not, then equals the = world.)=20 Importantly in the next thesis (2.05), Wittgenstein maintains that = all=20 those simple facts that do exist (existent atomic states of affairs that = do so=20 exist) also decide (or contain virtually, immanently, in their = logical=20 form) those simple facts which do not exist, do not subsist. = (Each fact=20 contains its own antithesis. [To use Searle's example]: the sign = communicating=20 "No Dogs Allowed" [i.e. a schematic picture of a dog with a red line = through it]=20 is essentially the same sign as its affirmation, i.e. the "not" part is=20 not a component of the picture. ¹² = Reality=20 (Wirklichkeit) can now be defined as all independent = existent /=20 subsistent (Bestehen) and non-existent (Nichtbestehen) = atomic=20 states of affairs (or independent positive and negative facts). This = determines=20 (or defines) reality in general. Finally, the world is re-defined at = 2.063 as=20 the complete reality (Die gesamte Wirklichkeit).=20

Out of these initial cosmological reflections, a picture of the = picture=20 theory begins, gradually, to emerge.

2.1 We make to = ourselves=20 pictures of facts [Wir machen uns Bilder der Tatsachen].=20

With this thesis, Wittgenstein inaugurates the initial discourse = of the=20 picture in the Tractatus (2.1 - 3.03). Facts can be presented in=20 pictures; such presented facts have the ability to re-present = reality as=20 defined above: existent and non-existent simple facts; that is to say, = we model=20 reality through thought by picturing portions of it (2.12).=20

But how is this possible?=20

Pictures are reducible to their structural elements and the = resultant=20 elements (as in the reconstruction of the accident scenario), says = Wittgenstein=20 are substitutes for the objects combined in real facts (or states of = affairs=20 (2.131)). Like the objects disposed in a fact, the elements of a picture = are=20 configured in a determinate, logically necessary way; because its=20 elements are linked together - that is, given in a context - the = picture=20 represents the atomic fact in which the objects are linked together=20 ('concatenated') in an cognate way.=20

2.1511 Thus the picture = is=20 linked with reality; it reaches up to it.=20

2.1512 It is like a = scale=20 applied to reality.=20

Pictures frame cells of reality as between the prongs of a = callipers; the=20 picture is essentially composite: it is a Gestalt-figure = (skhema).=20 (And these characteristics of the picture endow it with factual status - = but it=20 is another day's work to unpack the implications of this = proposition.)=20

A picture, in order to be representational must fulfil two = criteria: On=20 the one hand it must be somehow commensurate with the situation it = depicts:=20 fact-Gestalt, depicted in the picture, its objects becoming = pictorial=20 structural elements, means that it makes no sense to refer to - to = depict - an=20 isolated "object". Thus Wittgenstein (in 2.162) is able to say that = 'there must=20 be something identical' to both picture and depicted situation in order = for the=20 picture to function as a picture of the ontological state of = affairs. The=20 common identity that Wittgenstein discerns obtaining between picture and = fact=20 in the picture he terms 'representational form'.=20

2.171 The picture can = represent=20 [abbilden] every reality [Wirklichkeit] whose form=20
[Form] it = has.=20

The spatial = [r=E4umliche]=20 picture everything spatial, the coloured everything=20
coloured, etc.=20

Representational form can be seen as the capacity of the = structural=20 elements of the picture to meaningfully coalesce into a form reflexive = of the=20 Gestalt of objects in a fact. This, the minimal mutual = relationship of=20 "state of affairs" and picture means that the structural elements of = both are=20 co-ordinated in a one-to-one relationship. That is to say, the logical = form of=20 the disposition of things in the fact defines the form (or the sense) of = the=20 picture: where we may perhaps be able to depict illogical facts (in = dreams or in=20 our surrealist cartoons), we cannot depict impossible objects (like a = rolling=20 book, a spongy television screen or transparent milk).=20

On the other hand, in order to be a picture and not = be=20 confused with the possible ontological fact it depicts (something that - = despite=20 trompe l'oeil - never happens), the picture must be qualitatively = different to the depicted fact; if the picture were identical to the = fact=20 represented, it would be the fact and not a picture of it: = the=20 logic of representation would be outside the synthetic grasp of our = faculties.=20 To claim that identity and difference are both central to = representational form=20 means that a picture is essentially heterogeneous. And that is only to = say that=20 the picture does not contain its depicted state of affairs; it = does not=20 bracket it as an eidetic content; it does not envelop = it.=20

Although the picture is independent of the state of affairs it = depicts,=20 and thus assumes a perspective outside it, the picture cannot assume = such a=20 standpoint outside itself. The picture cannot stand outside itself = as it=20 were and depict its representational essence. Thus representational = form, the=20 condition of possibility of picturing a situation in general, is the one = thing=20 that the picture cannot depict about itself: it cannot represent what it = is=20 about itself that enables us to understand that it is the substitute for = an=20 ontological state of affairs and not this state of affairs = itself. In=20 sum, the picture cannot represent what it is about itself that makes it = a=20 picture - the representation of a possible fact. Rather = (Wittgenstein says=20 in 2.172) the picture simply projects its representational essence = forward: 'it=20 shows it forth'; and we understand this implicitly, intuitively.=20

If the atomic fact represented by the picture exists in reality, = the=20 picture is true: if what it depicts does not exist, the picture is false = ('2.21=20 'The picture agrees with reality or not; it is right or wrong, true or = false').=20 While the activity or faculty of picturing and the grasp of the logic of = representation may be a priori, Wittgenstein maintains that we = are unable=20 to determine from the picture alone if it is a true or a false = picture;=20 this can only be established a posteriori by referring to = empirical=20 reality. With the assertion that we always have to apply to experience = to=20 discover if the picture represents a case as it is, Wittgenstein = suggests=20 that no picture can be necessarily, analytically true. "No picture is=20 analytically true" means that the truth of pictures cannot be recognised = from=20 the picture alone: a picture is always a picture "of something".=20

Of what? Of reality (existent and non-existent states of = affairs).=20

The 50/50 probability of being false is essential to the = logic of=20 representation. And thus Wittgenstein maintains that the picture does = not=20 necessarily represent a state of affairs having a positive = ontological status, but depicts rather, a possible state of = affairs. This=20 ability to depict ontological possibilities (the possibility of = erroneous=20 representation) is essential to the logic of representation; that is, = for a=20 picture to be capable of representing reality accurately, it must (i) be = heterogeneous to what it depicts; (ii) be truth-functionally equivocal; = and=20 (iii) only ever be verified in a synthetic way.
=
=20

Next, drawing on the discourse of the picture, there follows a = short=20 passage on thought.=20

Wittgenstein begins by characterising the thought as a logical=20 picture: thought pictures the fact; that we can synthetically frame = a=20 possible fact in a picture is thus the same thing as saying we can = think=20 it. Through the universality of representational form (i.e. through the = logical=20 form that cognitive space shares with logical space in general), thought = can=20 frame existent facts in logical space; and hence the ability to = conceptually=20 construct possible facts is essential to the human cognitive = processes of=20 hope, of belief, of desire, of imagination, of dreaming (which some = philosophers=20 consider the defining characteristics of zoon logon echon). = Identifying=20 thought and logical picture enables Wittgenstein to draw out the = consequences of=20 his conclusions about the nature of picturing for his consideration of = the=20 proposition.

As it is with the picture so it is with the proposition.=20

4.1 The proposition is = a=20 picture of reality. The proposition is a model of the reality=20
as we think it is. =

The facility with which Wittgenstein moves from the thought to the = proposition suggests that he identifies the thought tout court = with the=20 proposition (c.f. 4). A proposition expresses a thought, he says: in the = sentence, the thought realises itself in a material medium.=20

        3.1 In the proposition = the=20 thought is expressed perceptibly through the senses.=20
        (Im Satz druckt = sich der=20 Gedanke sinnlich wahrnehmbar aus: In the proposition,=20
        the thought expresses = its=20 sensuous perceptibility).=20

A proposition is defined as the expression of a thought - i.e. the = medium=20 through which the thought is sensibly projected or inscribed; this is = the same=20 as saying that the sentence re-presents a thought in a form = amenable to=20 perception. Wittgenstein's characterisation of the thought in these = terms=20 suggests that for him the process of thinking (necessarily = representational) was=20 an aesthetic phenomenon. As is the case with the picture, we verify the = truth or=20 falsity of propositions expressive of thoughts through sense-experience = - by=20 relating them back to empirical reality (4.06).=20

To understand a proposition is to understand its sense. How can we = understand the sense of a proposition without having seen or heard it = before and=20 without knowing if it is true or false? Because it is a picture and = hence is=20 reflexive of the logical structure of the fact: it makes sense. Having=20 recognised that the sense of the proposition refers to the possible=20 configuration of things in possible atomic facts, we relate the = proposition=20 back reflexively (i.e. mediated through concepts, or signifieds, = in the=20 Saussurean sense) to the relevant cell of reality, and thereby establish = its=20 truth / falsity. And thus the reference of the picture is recognised, = and=20 consolidated or refuted.=20

4.16 In order to = understand the=20 essence of the proposition, consider hieroglyphic=20
writing, which = pictures the=20 facts it describes.=20

And from it came the = alphabet=20 without the essence of the representation being lost.=20

4.02 This we see from = the fact=20 that we understand the sense of the propositional=20
sign=20

without having had it = explained=20 to us.=20

4.021 The proposition = is a=20 picture of reality, for I know the state of affairs=20
presented=20

by it, if I understand = the=20 proposition. And I understand the proposition, without=20

having had its sense = explained=20 to me.=20

Three points can now be enumerated: 1) the proposition is a = picture; 2) it=20 images the facts it describes; 3) it exhibits its sense.=20

As with the representational form of the picture, the proposition = cannot=20 say what it is about itself that makes it a picture of the facts it = depicts;=20 rather it projects its sense, its logical form, silently from within = itself.=20 Like the hands of a speaker, silently gesticulating, soundlessly shaping = thoughts in the air,=20

4.22 The proposition=20 shows its sense.=20

The proposition = shows=20 how things stand, if it is true. And it says that they do = so=20
stand.=20

Propositions are thought-vectors, their sense consists in the = indicative=20 ability of their elements to pick out objects and articulate possible = states of=20 affairs. As objects configure themselves into facts in the world, so = signs are=20 'articulated' in the propositional sign; they are articulated in = the=20 anatomical sense, like the limbs of a skeleton=20

3.14 The propositional = sign=20 consists in the fact that its elements, the words, are=20
combined in it in a = definite=20 way.=20

The propositional sign = is a=20 fact.=20

Wittgenstein gets us to imagine the propositional sign as composed = of=20 'spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, books) instead of written = signs'. This=20 thought experiment elucidates the essence of the proposition. Of = extreme=20 significance for Wittgenstein, is the 'mutual spatial' disposition of = the taken=20 objects, tables, chairs etc. This 'expresses the sense of the = proposition'=20 (3.14131). In the ideal logical symbolism, the spatial disposition of = symbols in=20 the propositional calculus would correspond precisely to the disposition = of the=20 objects in the atomic state of affairs.

=

VII

As clothing conceals the form of the body, the sentence as it = phenomenally=20 appears, does not look like a picture. Ordinary language obscures its = underlying=20 logical form. Wittgenstein compares this obscuring relation to the = relation a=20 musical score has with the narrative of sounds it represents. Similarly, = the=20 graph only superficially appears to bear a relation to the dynamic = system it=20 represents - but we say it makes sense when we discern the definite = homology of=20 pattern informing it: 'these symbolisms' Wittgenstein writes, 'prove to = be=20 pictures - even in the ordinary sense of the word - of what they = represent'=20 (4.011). A proposition expressed in symbolic notation is pictorial in = this=20 sense. As a signifier, Wittgenstein writes, it bears an 'obvious' = material=20 similarity to its signifieds [Bezeichneten]. The internal = relation=20 associated with all these phenomena is that minimal logical = structure=20 shared by the logical picture, the thought, the proposition and the = fact: it is=20 the form of reality itself.=20

With the category of internal properties, Wittgenstein = simultaneously=20 differentiates and identifies picture and fact. An internal = property is=20 the defining or exclusive characteristic that gives a particular thing = its=20 identity. It is that "whatness" of the thing that it is impossible that=20 something should lack and still be itself (4.123). Without internal = properties,=20 the objects informing the fact would cease to be themselves. In this = context,=20 Wittgenstein also speaks of an "internal relation" or 'relation of = structure'=20 obtaining between objects in atomic facts (4.122). Again these internal=20 properties are the essential characteristics defining the simple = fact.=20

It is through their internal properties (which he says are = like=20 facial features) that a relation of structures - an internal relation - = can=20 subsist between different facts in the world. We can now say that = the=20 proposition can represent and communicate the essential properties of = a state=20 of affairs because the proposition also possesses essential (its own)=20 properties: And this it shares with the factual state of affairs. = What they=20 share, in sum, is the logical form of reality. It is this universality = of=20 logical structure that co-ordinates the elementary propositions of = language to=20 the atomic constituents of facts.=20

An internal relation whereby the proposition qua picture = both=20 accommodates and excludes the state of affairs it represents is the = condition of=20 possibility of representation in general. Representing the possible = ontological=20 fact means we must understand at once the similarity and the = difference=20 underlying their structure. Logical picture and reality, fact and=20 proposition are homologous structures, they are ostensibly different = yet they=20 follow an identical logic. What it is that gives a fact its defining = characteristics - those aspects that preclude its being something else - = that=20 make it incommensurable with other atomic facts? They are precisely = those=20 aspects that enable it to be depicted accurately in pictures, in = language.=20 The conditions of possibility of the picturing function of language are = the=20 self-same aspects that make it impossible for the picture to be the = thing=20 pictured.=20

Most significant about this notion of homologous structure, for=20 Wittgenstein, is that it cannot be expressed in denotative (or = communicable)=20 language.=20

        4.12 Propositions can = represent=20 the whole reality, but they cannot represent what=20
        they must have in = common with=20 reality in order to be able to represent it - the=20
        logical form.=20

To be able to represent = the=20 logical form, we should have to be able to put our=20
selves with the = propositions=20 outside logic, that is outside the world.=20

4.121 Propositions = cannot=20 represent the logical form: this mirrors itself in the=20
propositions.=20

That which mirrors = itself in=20 language, language cannot represent.=20

That which expresses = itself in=20 language, we cannot express by language.=20

The propositions show = the=20 logical form of reality.=20

They exhibit it.=20

Wittgenstein here (again) insists on the opposition between what = can be=20 said and what cannot be said but shown (the informing gesture of = the=20 Tractatus). According to Monk, the showing / saying distinction = is the=20 crucial nexus between Wittgensteinian logic and the ascetic silence = concerning=20 metaphysico-ethical meaning. As I tried to show in the opening sequence = of this=20 paper, despite a moratorium of silence concerning the axiological or the = transcendent, events of higher value yet manifest themselves, not = in=20 the world yet somehow in my world. When I begin to = appreciate the=20 world as a limited whole, there, I apprehend the metaphysical and = ethical. And so it is with logic: when we understand language as a = limited=20 whole, its underlying logical form becomes manifest, informing it - like = the=20 body its loose and baggy garments.=20

But why does Wittgenstein place a prohibition on naming the = internal=20 properties, the logical form of language?=20

If there is an answer to this question, perhaps it is this: No = Archimedian=20 point exists outside language from where we could analyse it thoroughly = - thus=20 there always an essential aspect of language that remains inscrutable to = us.=20 This ineffable aspect is essential to our understanding of language - it = is=20 logical form - it is shown forth. We are intuitively aware of the = ineffable=20 aspects of language: they show themselves in our use of language. In = fact it is=20 essential to language that there be something about it that cannot be = expressed=20 but makes itself manifest in those pictorial, pictogrammatic aspects of=20 language.=20

What they show (and this is the fundamental thesis of the=20 Tractatus) about language and monadologically about the world = cannot=20 be said. I am unable to express the truth of the relationship = between my=20 world and the language I use to describe that world. All that can be=20 unequivocally said must be worked through, rung by tortuous rung. Until = one=20 night, elucidation gleams darkly behind the stripped and denuded, = skeletal and=20 anorexic propositions we are limited to. And in that nocturnal Penelope = work of=20 recognition that is philosophy, we recognise the propositions of the=20 Tractatus as senseless (Sinnlos) ¹³: we=20 negate their negation. And in this night, understanding returns = to where=20 it was most rigorously expunged - in the attempt as such. Just as = the=20 underlying logical structure of language is made manifest when we = experience the=20 limits of language, when we experience the world as a limited whole with = the "I"=20 as the limiting case - the ethical becomes manifest. At this = limit, the=20 relationship of language and the world "as such" cannot be expressed in = language=20 - or in the world - but rather becomes manifest in the experience of the = limits=20 of language, in the experience of the aporia as such, in the = experience=20 of the hopeless attempt "as such".
=20

&= nbsp; =20 Nur um der Hoffnungslosen willen ist uns die Hoffnung gegeben.=20

&= nbsp; &n= bsp; &nb= sp; &nbs= p; =20 - Walter Benjamin ¹⁴

=20

NOTES

1.   In The Complete Dramatic = Works;=20 London and Boston: Faber & Faber 1986, page 113.=20
2.   Those familiar with critical = theory will=20 perceive the unconcealed reference to Adorno's 1965 essay on Beckett's = Endgame=20 "Versuch das Endspiel zu verstehen" in all this. They will also = no doubt=20 recall the negative work that Adorno demands of the word "understand"=20 (Verstehen) in that essay. To understand Endgame is to understand = that it=20 cannot be understood. I refer also to Simon Critchley's excellent = analysis of=20 the modality of "Versuch" in Adorno's essay in his 1997 Very = Little =85=20 Almost Nothing; Death, Philosophy, Literature. See especially page=20 147.=20
3.   7 Wovon man nicht sprechen = kann, daruber=20 muss man schweigen (Whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be=20 silent).=20
4.   Again, I am using Ray Monk's = translation=20 of this letter here; this line appears in Levi as: ' "to set limits to = the=20 domain of the ethical from the inside - which is the only way it can be=20 rigorously done"' (in Levi: 1978-9; 72); See Monk, Wittgenstein, The = Duty of=20 Genius. London: Jonathan Cape, 1990 page 178.=20
5.   Levi draws mostly on William = Warren=20 Bartley's book Wittgenstein for his biographical material. He = cites=20 Wittgenstein's correspondence to Paul Englemann between December 1916 = and=20 September 1925 ('The letters are both highly personal [he writes] and = enigmatic.=20 But one thing runs through them like a trail of blood [!] - a deep = consciousness=20 of personal guilt' (66). This guilt is occasioned by Wittgenstein's 'not = being=20 able to get over a particular fact =85 It was [William Warren] Bartley's = not=20 entirely sympathetic function to ground this unmistakably in = Wittgenstein's role=20 as guilty homosexual' (67). In this context it is worth reading the = Appendix=20 ("Bartley's Wittgenstein and the Coded Remarks") of Monk's biography. = 'In=20 writing this book, I have had unrestricted access to all the coded = remarks in=20 possession of the literary executors, and permission to quote any of = them that I=20 wish. I have chosen to quote virtually all the remarks that are in any = way=20 revealing of Wittgenstein's emotional, spiritual and sexual life. =85 I = have left=20 nothing out that hat would lend support to the popular notion that = Wittgenstein=20 was tormented by his homosexuality, although I myself believe this to be = a=20 simplification that seriously misrepresents the truth' (585). =
6.   I borrow this idea and = phrasing from=20 Theodor W. Adorno's "Towards an Understanding of Endgame": in = Twentieth=20 Century Interpretations of Endgame, A Collection of Critical Essays. = edited=20 by Bell Gale Chevigny; Prentice Hall, Inc, 1969 p 83.=20
7.   These ideas are taken from a = lecture=20 Wittgenstein delivered in November 1929 to the Heretics Society in = Cambridge.=20 See Wittgenstein: "A Lecture on Ethics", Philosophical Review = Volume 74,=20 January 1965, in Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951. Edited = by=20 James C. Klagge and Alfred Nordmann; Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett = Publishing Company 1993, pp 37-44.=20
8.   See Derrida, Jacques: Of=20 Grammatology pp 19 and 45 (1974, translated by G. C. Spivak) for an = example=20 of his use of the Heideggerian-influenced (from The Question of = Being,=20 [see Heidegger, 1956 page 81 where Being is famously put "under = erasure"])=20 strategy of materially placing the signifiers of concepts sous = rature. I=20 stress in this context that a concept cannot be "said" while "under = erasure".=20 See also Christopher Norris's (1991) Deconstruction, Theory and = Practice=20 page 69 for a discussion of the Derridean use of the sous=20 rature.=20
9.   See Monk, Wittgenstein, The = Duty of=20 Genius. op. cit. page 117.=20
10.   See Wahl, Russell. = "Impossible=20 Propositions and the Forms of Objects in Wittgenstein's = Tractatus" The=20 Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 46, no. 179, April 1995 page = 190.=20
11.   See Stenius, E.: = Wittgenstein's=20 Tractatus. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960.=20
12.   See Magee, Bryan. = "Wittgenstein, A=20 Dialogue with John Searle" in The Great Philosophers, An Introduction = to=20 Western Philosophy. 1987 pages 324-325.=20
13.   See Wahl on the distinction = between=20 Sinnlos and Unsinnig in the Tractatus. Wahl, = Russell.=20 "Impossible Propositions and the Forms of Objects in Wittgenstein's=20 Tractatus" 1995 op. cit. page 190.=20
14.   Walter Benjamin. Goethes=20 Wahlverwandtschaften, in Gesammelte Schriften I . 1, 1980 page = 201=20

References

Adorno, Theodor W. "Towards an Understanding of = Endgame", in=20 Twentieth Century Interpretations of Endgame, A Collection of = Critical=20 Essays. Edited by Bell Gale Chevigny; Prentice Hall, Inc, 1969 pp=20 82-114.=20
Beckett, Samuel. "Endgame" in The Complete = Dramatic=20 Works. London and Boston: Faber & Faber 1986, pp = 89-134.=20
Benjamin, Walter. "Goethes Wahlverwandtschaften" in Gesammelte=20 Schriften I . 1, Frankfurt am Main: suhrkamp Verlag 1980.=20
Critchley, Simon. Very Little =85 Almost = Nothing: Death,=20 Philosophy, Literature; London and New York: Routledge = 1997.=20
Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology. = Translated G. C.=20 Spivak Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, = 1974.=20
Heidegger, Martin. The Question of Being. = Translated=20 with an introduction by William Kluback and Jean T. Wilde; New York: = Twayne=20 Publishers inc., 1958.=20
Kenny, Anthony. Wittgenstein. New York and = London:=20 Penguin Books, 1973.=20
Kiekegaard, S=F8ren. Either/Or Volume = One.=20 Translated by David F. Svenson and Lillian Marvin Svenson, with = revisions and a=20 foreword by Howard A. Johnson; New Jersey: Princeton University Press=20 1919.=20
Levi, Albert W. "The Biographical Sources of = Wittgenstein's=20 Ethics" in Telos 38 Winter 1978-79.=20
Mackey, Louis. "S=F8ren Kierkegaard: The Poetry of = Inwardness"=20 in Existential Philosophers: Kierkegaard to Merleau-Ponty. Edited = by=20 George Alfred Schrader Jr. New York: Mc Graw Hill Inc., 1967. =
Magee, Bryan. "Wittgenstein, A Dialogue with John = Searle" in=20 The Great Philosophers, An Introduction to Western Philosophy. = Oxford=20 University Press, 1987; pp 320-347.=20
Monk, Ray. Wittgenstein, The Duty Of = Genius. London:=20 Jonathan Cape, 1990.=20
Stenius, E. Wittgenstein's Tractatus. = Oxford: Basil=20 Blackwell, 1960.=20
Wahl, Russell. "Impossible Propositions and the = Forms of=20 Objects in Wittgenstein's Tractatus" in The Philosophical = Quarterly Vol.=20 46, no. 179, April 1995 pp 190-198.=20
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. "A Lecture on Ethics" in = The=20 Philosophical Review vol. 74, no. 1, January 1965 pp 4-14; in=20 Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951. Edited by James = C.=20 Klagge and Alfred Nordmann; Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett = Publishing=20 Company 1993, pp 37-44.=20
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus = Logico-Philosophicus.=20 Translated by C. K. Ogden with an introduction by Bertrand Russell; = London and=20 New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1922.
=

Copyright =A9 1998 Minerva. All Rights=20 Reserved.

A version of this paper was presented to the Limerick Philosophical = Society=20 in 1998.=20
Kieran Anthony Cashell, M.A. is a tutor in = Philosophy at=20 Mary Immaculate College, University of Limerick and a lecturer in = Critical and=20 Contextual Studies at the Limerick School of Art and Design, = Ireland.=20
Mail to: = Kieran=20 Anthony Cashell
=20

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