Actions and Mechanisms as Basic Forms of Knowledge

Lecture Four

Actions and Mechanisms: the Foundation of Knowledge

theory of actions in biological context;
the ecological meaning of embodiment;
mechanisms as partial explanations; mechanisms in science,
narratives, and everywhere;
mechanisms and the theory of causation;
natural causation and causal depth.

1. The Biology of Embodiment

Embodiment, repetiton: the typical form is either
        action selection in low level organisms
        grounding conceptual meaning in man

Both are (somewhat) static (except maybe force embodiment, Telen).
Now we elaborate the full biological meaning of embodied cognition as action complex.

The philogenetic basis of cognition is pure motion:
                e.g. early evolution of the nervous system in cnidaria
"cognition" helps spontaneous motion by coordination of autonomous skin cell activities.
In higher organisms cognitive experience is relative to (and continuous with) such motion based exerience.

1.1. Embodied action as the source of certainty (a philosopical detour)
It is a notiorious question, what do we know for certain (---> Cartesian skepticim).
Maybe it is easy to believe that our knowledge is (under suitable circustances) reliable.
But it is difficult to show this - and to find the "suitable" citcumstances.
Here we face the problem of illusions and other complications.
Most if this consideration is perceptual (the mind as system with input).
Active embodiment has a different suggestion.
The source of certainty is motoric - exerted AND perceived own motion.
Since there is feedback, there can be little doubt that the two are the same.
(Intellectually you can doubt anything but in evolution that is not useful - it is useful to USE.)
Oganisms are bonr into a world in which (feedback from) own action (motor experience IS reliable.
The proof of the reliablity is that the action - perception cycle bootstraps all other knowledge.
There is no Cartesian doubt because the self can manpulate the world (and through that, the own percepts
in synergy - which is mutually reinforcing for the "well prepared child" - relaxes tension and
fulfils expectation). [Equipped to live in a certain kind of world, of course - this is not a limitation
but a new level oif understandig]

1.2. Forms of reliable experience
Exploratory behavior - a complex of locomotion and solicited/facilitated perception.
Reaching and approaching is an example. [animals apprach "stimuli" - in fact handle situations, episodes]
Own perception is subordinate to own motion/action.
"I believe if I see" -- this is replaced in active embodiment by "I believe if I do".
(How to transform perceptual experience into motor experience and back.)
Manipulation is the key world
.
1.3. The Body Scheme - between the body and the world.
The BS gives the limit of the body.
Not pre-given but actively maintained and monitored.
(This cannot be otherwise because the body changes continually - many theories forget this)
[Releveant psychological evidence on active role of monitoring - e.g. floatation tanks ---> John Lilly but be warned!)]
Radical changes of the physical body are incorporated effortlessly - development, accidents, losts limbs, againg.
Here is a major difference between
        Cartesian mind - embodied mind; and
        Passive embodiment - active embodiment
                Imagine even an "embodied robot" undergoing damage -
                  embodied action may be robust to overcome this (e.g. difference feedback based control)
                  but the "perceived" world will be different.

The most important aspect of active embodiment is the permanence of the world when the body changes.
Passive minds would undergo experience (receive "input") which changes with the "interface", so the world would have to change.
Active minds are based on a different principle - not the world but the body scheme is changed instead.
An embodied biological mind is (and MUST be) invariant for changes of this kind.

1.4. Sources of invariant knowledge
(Presently: it is not known how an organism can achieve all this by means of physiology of cognition. But:)
The invariant element is possible to formulate.
Obviously, it is not related to percept and experience, or to any concrete motion, since these all change.
It is not contingency based, in other words - but related to how these contingencies are organized.
The invariant element is a certain integrative pattern of action and effect,
    It is the same pattern as that which constitutes the "episodes" we talked about.
I will call that "mechanism".

2. Explanation and Causality
We look into the general theory of explanations to understand why mechanisms are so special.

2.1. Causal explanations
A causal explanation answers the question "why"? This notion goes back to Aristotle (although concepts changed since then).
For some introduction, see Dennett's DDI.
            Daniel C. Dennett (1006): Darwin's Dangerous Idea, Touchstone Books.

There are several types of causal explanations (e.g. goal, form, etc) but not all of them "feel" equally causal.
A usual causal explanation, esp. in science, is based on a cause -effect pair, where the cause and the effect are events.
The cause is the explanation of the effect.
(This gets a lot more complicated very soon... but it is a good start).

A causes B:         event A         evokes, is followed by    event B                    (simplest case: manipulation of A)
The Humean problem: only constant conjuction is visible, the rest is....

2.2. Explanations in general: the d-n model
The "deductive - nomological" (or d-n) model of Hempel and Oppenheim
Deduction means (as in logic) the operation by which formal conclusions are derived.
Nomological - the Greek word "nomos" means "law" - this case natural law, or scientific law.
(A remark - the term "law" is from 18.-19. centrury and is a bit obsolete in serious scientific talk.)

The d-n model says that explanation in science is done by general laws
        which are applied to concrete cases.
Note that it suggests a research methodology:
        try to find the general laws - until then, an explanation is not well-suited.

The d-n model is simplisitc and was often criticized but reflect actual scientific research in "classical" style.
Best examples from physics and other advanced sciences. http://www.soc.iastate.edu/sapp/phil_sci_lecture02.html is a good introduction.

The d-n model:
                                C1 ..... Cn
                                L1 ...... Lm
                                --------------
                                E1 .... Ek

where C-s are contingents (such as initial conditions, circumstances), L-s are laws (equations, principles, etc)
         and E-s are "explananda" (the plural of "explanandum" - that which is to be explained).

2.3. Causes in the d-n explanation
What is a cause here? - anything.
In the d-n scheme anything can be an answer to the "why" question:
Each element of the d-n scheme can be used in a causal way.
(We can test this on a few examples.)
If we expect causes to be event- like and manipulation-based, this makes little difference.
For instance, even L-s are manipulable (maybe not the law of gravitation but e.g. dynamical laws = dynamical systems)

The d-n is a quite general model, which is domain-independent; in some domains we use more causal talk, in others
    (like gravitation) sometimes we use less (but it is still possible to say that gravity causes free fall.)
Causality, according to this picture, is not a unique, well defined form of dependence, but rather a way of looking at things
(in fact - if this were true - Russell would be quite right, that causality is not necessary, after all).

3. Mechanisms
Mechanisms are a form of causal explanation which is particularly relevant for action and cognition.
Mechanism sugest a diferent picture from the above.

3.1. What is a mechanism?
A mechanism is a causal relation between manipulable events A and B, for which
    there is a sperate language.
This language consists of expressions of the type "if A then B".
The interpretation is this: "if A is the case, such that I made it, then B is the case, such that A makes it".

Illustration:
                    machines with the displacement of parts.            (cf. "The Incredible Machine")
                    some everyday manipulation schemes                (cf. how children operate devices)

3.2. A note: The role of manipulation in causality
        (1) it makes "evocation" certain - as certain as you can get
        (2) because of active embodiment it has primacy over perception
                    (and over the observation of patters - which is the basic form of Hume's problem)
Mechanisms exemplify this advantage and may the the most basic causal forms.

3.3. Mechanisms as partial explanations
A mechanism is an action scheme but also an explanation scheme.
("The video plyeback started because I pressed the button" etc.)
A mechanism is an explanation scheme
                    C1 .... Cm -----> E1.... Ek
In the case of machines etc, this means "doing physics without physics": solving the problem of motion
                    without knowing anything about Newton.
That is, a mechanism an explanation works (in the presence of, but) without reference to natural laws.
How is that possible?

3.4. Mechanisms as friendly systems
It is clear that a form C ---> E is not universal
        (1) otherwsie L would never be needed, and d-n science would not exist
        (2) examples from "Incredible Machine" illustrate the point
A mechanism is a special case, where L-s are not needed, because the C's alone determine the outcome -
        given the mechanism itself, as a whole (i.e. ceteris paribus).
From the point of view of claasical mechanics: these are totally constrained systems.
In a more general sense, this assumes a certain arrangement or "organization" that fixes (i.e. freezes out)
        the relationship between contingent events and laws.

3.5. Other special properties of mechanisms
The principle of positivity           only positive cases; compare this use of if.... then with the definition of the same connective in logic
The princple of unity                        a mechanism is not an inference from A, but rather an inference scheme A --> B,
                                                       where A and B together constitute the mechanism
The principle of opacity                   mechanisms are intrasparent

3.6. Mechanism as prototypes for the causal relation
Mechanisms are causal forms which intermediate between actions and natural causes (the double role of A).
Hence, they are the source of causal conceptions both with and without human action.
Mecfhanisms suggest that a causal explanation is related to a particular type of relation , C --> E, with material
condtions "ceteris paribus" substituting for L.

3.7. The importance of mechanisms for science
Mechanisms offer general forms for
        (1) everyday explanations,
               which are
        (2) the basis of all scientific explanations

Nb. What does an(y) explanation mean? an explanation must be based on words that we understand
then we can ask for an explanation of that, etc. Iteratively, in the end, only everyday words remain.
Where do they come from? As part of the present general methodology I am suggesting that the origin
(and the typical form) of everyday knowledge is knowledge about mechanisms. Therefore, mechanisms
(are suggested to) constitute both the ultimate basis and a template form, for science.
It is a long way from here to the d-n model and to show that is heavily relies on mechanisms - that in
fact "natural laws" are generalized mechanisms, and that, therefore, in the end all science is just causality.
Nb.What does an experiment mean? Scientifc knowledge transalted to everyday knowledge, and used in the
interest of everyday maniupulation.
We stop discussing these questions now, to turn back to cognitive problems.

3.8. The importance of mechanisms for cognition (and philosophy)
Mechanisms are
            general schemes for action
            general schemes for the organization of events
            general schemes for explanation (and underlying other explanatons)
            general schemes underlying reason(ing) and rationality
            general schemes underlying mental structures
            general schemes for language use

The logic of the build-up of the story is this.
            Embodied actions are the primary;
            mechanisms are invariance patterns of actions integrated into action-event wholes.
            Mechanisms are generalized (in fact partially contain) event - event structures.
            This is used in various explanations: everyday and scientific.
            Reason, rationality, mental structure and language are related to a different concept: that of narratives.

Next I will discuss the idea that narratives are also based on mechanisms, which completes the above list.

4. Narratives

(I skip this to Lecture Five).

The following introduction to narratives uses materials from these sites:
   Narratives as Instruments of Psychological Coherence                     http://www.jate.u-szeged.hu/~pleh/magyar/cikkek/regi/koh1.html
   Introduction to Narratology                     http://www.sla.purdue.edu/academic/engl/theory/narratology/index.html

What do we see on this picture?
Of course (copyright xx), equipped with the concept, we can now say that this is a narrative.

A régi regényírók az élet különös, kaotikus anyagából az egyszerű és világos racionalizmus szálát igyekeztek kibontani; optikájukban a cselekvést racionálisan megragadható indok szüli, majd a cselekvés új cselekvést vált ki. A kaland nem egyéb, mint cselekedetek világos oksági láncolata. (Milan Kundera: A regény művészete. Bp: Európa, 1992, 78. lap, Réz Pál fordítása)

In the deep, underlying the narrative there is a mechanism
The narrative structure is a coipy of the mechnism structure
            linear
            temporarl arrngement
            Kundera

The conept of mechamism in this context
            says more
            fundamental: the animal origin of narratives