JaiLENS: Supervised Contrastive Pair Learning for Taxonomy-Aware and Zero-Day NonNL Jailbreak Classification

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Abstract. Jailbreak attacks that are crafted using non-natural language (NonNL) represent an emerging and underdefended threat. Existing defenses rely on surface-pattern feature extraction and closed-set jailbreak datasets, leaving a critical security gap in generalizing to zero-day attack variants not observed during training.

We propose **JaiLENS**, a supervised learning method that integrates contrastive pair-learning with a difference-feature fusion layer, trained using both supervised contrastive loss and cross-entropy loss. This approach enables JaiLENS to reliably identify known jailbreak attacks, and abstain from decisions on zero-day attacks using per-class confidence thresholds. Empirically, JaiLENS achieves a perfect F1 score of **1.00** on taxonomy-aware attack classification. For zero-day attacks, we compared JaiLENS with a base classifier that includes only an encoder and classification head, but is trained solely with cross-entropy supervision. The results show that JaiLENS reaches a zero-day F1 of **0.77**, outperforming the base classifier (0.59), while maintaining an overall F1 of **0.88**. This indicates that contrastive learning improves generalization to unseen attack variants beyond what cross-entropy supervision alone can achieve.

Keywords: Non-Natural Language Jailbreak · Jailbreak Classification · Zero-Day Jailbreak Classification · Supervised Contrastive Learning · Difference-Aware Fusion · Large Language Model Safety

1 Introduction

Large Language Models (LLMs) have been extensively developed and are now widely integrated across many applications, such as assistants, decision-support tools in high-stakes domains. This broad adoption creates an attack surface that malicious actors can exploit to carry out harmful activities using LLMs.

The Non-Natural Language (NonNL) jailbreak was introduced in [22] and uses unstructured sequences to hide harmful instructions without interpretable natural-language meaning. It transforms harmful prompts into surface representations that preserve the prompt's original semantic intent while removing lexical and syntactic cues that resemble natural language. This enables attacks to

evade token-level filters [23], perplexity-based detectors [1], and prompt-injection classifiers [24] that were never trained to recognize encoding-level evasion. The lack of a clear detection signal is precisely what makes NonNL jailbreaks a disproportionately dangerous attack surface in production LLM deployments. This definition includes a broad and expanding taxonomy of attack techniques, including: `base64`, `payload_split`, `ascii_art` [14], etc. Beyond these known categories, attackers continuously devise novel jailbreak attacks—so-called *zero-day attacks*—that have never been observed before.

Currently, safety guardrails and defense methods are being continuously proposed and studied, including content moderation classifiers and prompt-level filters [20, 21, 17, 13]. However, most approaches rely on natural language (NL) understanding of prompts. They operate under the assumption that harmful intent will appear in recognizable natural-language surface forms that safety classifiers can detect. Several jailbreak detection AI models have been trained solely on NL jailbreak datasets [24, 18]. As a result, these methods are insufficient for NonNL jailbreak prompts, in which no explicit harmful pattern is observable in the text, and the prompt is assembled to look benign, becoming harmful only when the LLM decodes or reassembles it. These limitations highlight the lack of defenses against NonNL jailbreaks. Critically, the existing detection models are typically closed-set classifiers that cannot generalize beyond their training distribution or distinguish between attack types.

Our Work We propose JaiLENS, a supervised contrastive pair-learning model that combines a customized Difference-Aware Fusion layer with handcrafted NonNL feature extraction for taxonomy-aware and zero-day NonNL jailbreak classification. JaiLENS addresses the limitations of NonNL jailbreaks and zero-day attacks in existing work by jointly optimizing a supervised contrastive loss and a cross-entropy loss. This objective trains the encoder to organize its embedding space so that samples of the same attack type cluster together. As a result, the model can reliably classify known attack types and abstain on zero-day inputs whose embeddings fall outside the established clusters. Moreover, instead of training on isolated jailbreak prompts, we use pairs of original and jailbreak prompts as input. This lets the model learn the transformation features characteristic of each attack type, so that at inference time it can classify a jailbreak prompt independently, without access to the original prompt.

This paper makes the following contributions:

- **Novel contrastive pair-learning for NonNL jailbreak detection.** We propose JaiLENS, a supervised contrastive pair-learning approach specifically designed for jailbreak classification, jointly optimized under supervised contrastive loss and cross-entropy classification to learn a geometrically structured embedding space that supports both taxonomy-aware classification and zero-day abstention within a unified architecture.
- **Systematic comparison of traditional ML-based classifiers as well as transformer-based classification models against taxonomy-aware jailbreaks.** We benchmark four common ML-based algorithms (Logistic Regression, XGBoost, KNN, Linear SVM) using TF-IDF embedding against

transformer-based deep neural network models (base classifier and JaiLENS) using a BERT encoder on the taxonomy-aware jailbreak classification.
– **Evaluation of JaiLENS's effectiveness and robustness against zero-day NonNL jailbreaks.** We conduct an experimental comparison between JaiLENS and a transformer-based classifier to detect zero-day NonNL attacks using a post-learning per-class confidence threshold strategy.

2 Background and Related Work

2.1 NonNL Jailbreak Attacks

NonNL jailbreaks combine meaningless strings or apply encoding and visualization techniques to confuse models and force them to generate unexpected content. Preliminary experimental results in [22] also show the high risk of these attacks. They bypassed LLM's safety mechanisms and producing unexpected responses with highly scores, especially for open-source models. The NonNL jailbreak taxonomy includes encoding attacks (e.g., base64, hex), adversarial attacks, formatting attacks, homotopy-inspired attacks, and visual-based methods.

2.2 Existing Jailbreak Attack Defenses

Several research studies have been published to counter jailbreaks; including mitigation-based, detection-based defenses. Mitigation-based methods prevent the LLMs to suppress harmful outputs by preprocessing the prompt. SafeDecoding [28] constructs a safety-aware token distribution at inference time to prevent the generation of harmful content. Detection-based approaches instead stop harmful inputs before they reach the model. Classifier-based guardrails such as LlamaGuard [20, 21], PIGuard [17] fine-tune LLMs on curated harmful prompt datasets to perform binary safety classification. Transcript-based classifier [27] generate transcripts from both the input and the output, then check whether they contain harmful content. However, this approach depends on understanding the prompt, so it cannot handle meaningless jailbreak prompts which is a key characteristic of NonNL attacks.

To bridge the gap, we propose JaiLENS, which is a lightweight model that classifies each incoming prompt into one of three categories—`no_attack`, attack type, or `zero-day`—before the prompt reaches the LLM. It provides two operational advantages absent from prior work: first, heavy mitigation steps are bypassed for prompts classified as clean, preserving end-to-end latency for legitimate users; second, known attack types receive deterministic, attack-specific mitigation responses tailored to the identified encoding technique rather than a generic refusal, while zero-day prompts can be routed to a more robust mitigation method. To the best of our knowledge, JaiLENS is the first attack classification model that treats NonNL jailbreak classification as a structured, taxonomy-aware multi-class problem with an explicit zero-day output class, rather than a binary harmful/benign decision over NonNL jailbreak inputs.

2.3 Contrastive Learning

Contrastive learning has attracted considerable attention for its strong performance in representation learning. It aims to pull points from the same class closer together in the embedding space while pushing points from different classes farther apart. In this paper we use SupCon loss, which has been shown to outperform cross-entropy and other contrastive losses for classification tasks [16].

3 Threat Model

We consider the threat model to be a black-box adversary targeting a deployed LLM service initialized with a confidential system prompt, optionally protected by an internal safeguard integrated in LLM.

The attacker's objective is using a jailbreak technique ($\mathcal{E}$) to transform an original harmful instruction ($\mathbf{x}_{harm}$) into a harmful jailbreak prompt, defined as $\mathbf{x}_{adv} = \mathcal{E}(\mathbf{x}_{harm})$. The NonNL attack technique $\mathcal{E}$ is selected from a taxonomy $\mathcal{T}$. The attack aims to generate a NonNL jailbreak prompt that bypasses LLM safeguards and compels them to produce harmful responses.


For defense, JaiLENS classifies each input into one of three categories—`no_attack`, a known attack type $\hat{t} \in \mathcal{T}$, or `zero-day`—with the defender goal of maximizing classification across both known and unseen attacks.

4 Methodology


4.1 Architecture

The architecture of the jailbreak classification model is visualized in Figure 1a. It consists of three main components: a Siamese Dual Encoder (SDE), a customized Difference-Aware Fusion Layer, and a Multi-task Classification Head. The SDE uses the pre-trained BERT-tiny model to embed the prompts into vector representations that capture relationships among words and phrases. The fusion layer is a difference-aware component that captures the differences between the original and jailbreak prompts, making the model pair-aware rather than relying solely on the jailbreak prompt. Finally, the multi-task classification head is a 2-layer Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) that computes and classifies the label as a specific attack, no attack, or zero-day label that may represent an unseen attack outside the model's knowledge.

During training, both the original prompt and the jailbreak prompt are processed simultaneously. The fusion layer acts not merely as a concatenation operator, but as an explicit semantic-divergence signal by leveraging information extracted from both prompts. A joint loss is then computed for training and optimization processes. The joint loss combines cross-entropy loss for the classification task with contrastive loss to geometrically shape the embedding space. The optimization process then update all shared parameters, including the BERT encoder, the classification head, and the projection head.



(a) JaiLENS consists of a dual encoder, a fusion layer for detecting prompt differences, and a classifier that labels prompts as known attacks, no attack, or zero-day attacks.



(b) During inference, the classifier trained using JaiLENS outputs a predicted class and the confidence probability p. If $p < \theta$, the prompt is flagged as `zero_day`; otherwise, it is assigned its predicted class (`no_attack` or a specific attack type).

Fig. 1: Overview of the JaiLENS classifier training methodology (a), as well as the use of the trained classifier in the inference phase (b).

Siamese Dual Encoder (SDE) It comprises two parameter-identical encoders that independently map paired inputs into a joint embedding space [9]. We use a tiny version of BERT [15] as the core model, as it is known for effectively capturing relationships between words and phrases in text [8]. We pass both the original and jailbreak prompts through the TinyBERT-based SDE encoder, sharing weights and forcing them into a unified semantic space. Compared with using two separate encoders, SDE preserves comparability when the jailbreak prompt

is derived from the original prompt via specific attack techniques, because both are embedded in the same semantic space.

Difference-Aware Fusion Layer The fusion layer converts the geometric gap between the original and jailbreak prompt representations into an explicit, computable signal, allowing the model to learn and distinguish attack patterns across diverse techniques. This is motivated by training a generic sentence encoder via Natural Language Inference, which extracts relationships between sentence pairs to capture universally useful features [7].

In this paper, we construct a five-component fused representation. It comprises: (i) the original embedding h_{orig}; (ii) the jailbreak embedding h_{jail}; (iii) the absolute element-wise difference $|h_{orig} - h_{jail}|$, which directly encodes where the semantic deviation introduced by the attack occurs; (iv) the element-wise product $h_{orig} \odot h_{jail}$, which captures the interaction between the two texts—that is, what structural and semantic content they retain in common despite the obfuscation; and (v) our handcrafted divergence features $\Delta feats$, which inject interpretable, domain-specific structural signals derived from the NonNL characteristics. Together, these components force the model to reason about both the magnitude and the direction of the semantic shift introduced by the attack, rather than treating the jailbreak prompt as a self-contained input. Consequently, the discriminative signal exploited by our model lies not within the jailbreak representation in isolation, but in the relational gap between the original and jailbreak inputs. In our model, we extend the handcrafted $\Delta feats$ component to better adapt to NonNL attack prompts, as explained in detail below:

- **Levenshtein Distance** [30]: Measure the minimum step of single-character edits required to transform the original prompt into jailbreak prompt.
- **Shannon Entropy** [25]: Measure how unpredictable of a character distribution within a string. Using the equation $H = -\sum_c p(c) log_2 p(c)$, where $p(c)$ is the relative frequency of character c, we computed three entropy-based features: the entropy of original prompt (H_{orig}), the entropy of jailbreak prompt (H_{jail}), and the absolute difference ($\Delta H = |H_{jail} - H_{orig}|$). A large ΔH indicates that the jailbreak technique substantially alters the statistical character distribution of the original prompt.
- **Special Character Ratio**: Measure the proportion of special characters in the jailbreak prompt
- **Non-ASCII Ratio**: Measure the ratio of characters in the jailbreak prompt that fall outside the standard ASCII range (e.g., Unicode characters). This feature captures jailbreak techniques that use non-Latin scripts, such as Unicode-encoded representations.
- **Word Length Ratio**: Measure how much the jailbreak inflates the lengths of individual words compared to the original. We computed the ratio of the average token length in the jailbreak prompt to that in the original prompt using the following equation: $R_{word} = \frac{\bar{l}*jail}{\max(\bar{l}*orig,1)}$, where $\bar{l}$ is the mean number of characters per whitespace-delimited token.

Multi-task Classification Head The classification head is a 2-layer MLP that classifies each prompt into a specific class, where each attack technique corresponds to one class. It outputs the predicted class label along with its corresponding probability.

Classification Loss For the attack-type classification task, we train the model using cross-entropy loss. Because this is a multi-class classification problem, we compute the multiclass cross-entropy loss [19], as defined below:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{CE}} = -\frac{1}{N}\Sigma_{i=1}^{N}\Sigma_{j=1}^{C}[y_{i,j}.log(p_{i,j})] \tag{1}$$

where N is number of samples, C is the number of classes, y_{ij} is 1 if class j is correct for sample i, 0 otherwise, and p_{ij} is model-predicted probability of sample i being in class j.

Projection Head In contrastive learning, the optimal representation space for the contrastive objective differs from the optimal space for classification. A projection head is used to absorb the distortion needed to satisfy the contrastive objective, while allowing the encoder to develop representations for downstream tasks [29]. We instantiate it as a multi-layer perceptron (MLP) with an output vector of size 128. It is primarily used in self-supervised learning [26, 5] to transform and compress representations before computing the loss, improving downstream performance. It is discarded after training because it already contains logic specific to the self-supervised objective.

Contrastive Loss Besides the standard cross-entropy loss for the classification task, we incorporate contrastive learning to explicitly shape the geometric structure of the encoder's embedding space. This trains the encoder to learn semantically meaningful, cluster-structured representations that generalize beyond surface-level token patterns. In this paper, we computed contrastive loss using SupCon [16] function, which is defined by the following equation:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{SupCon}} = \sum_{i\in I}\frac{-1}{|P(i)|}\sum_{p\in P(i)}\log\frac{\exp\left(\mathbf{z}_i\cdot\mathbf{z}_p/\tau\right)}{\sum_{a\in A(i)}\exp\left(\mathbf{z}_i\cdot\mathbf{z}_a/\tau\right)}. \tag{2}$$

A positive set $P(i)$ consists of all other samples in the mini-batch that share the same label as sample i, while the negative samples are all remaining batch elements. Here, $\mathbf{z}_i$ denotes the ℓ_2-normalized embedding of sample i, $\tau > 0$ is the temperature parameter controlling the sharpness of the softmax distribution, I is the set of batch indices, and $A(i) = I \setminus \{i\}$ denotes all batch samples except the anchor sample i. This objective simultaneously encourages intra-class compactness and inter-class separation.

Contrastive learning provides a key benefit in our model by enabling zero-day attack classification. The encoder learns to embed each attack in a distinct region, well separated from others. This separation prevents it from being misclassified as another attack.

Joint Training Loss During training, our model uses a joint loss that combines a classification loss (cross-entropy, $\mathcal{L}_{\text{CE}}$) for the attack classification task and a contrastive loss (SupCon, $\mathcal{L}_{\text{SupCon}}$) to shape the encoder's embedding space. Cross-entropy teaches the model to classify attacks, while SupCon also sculpts the geometry of the embedding space. We define the joint loss as follows:

$$\mathcal{L} = \alpha * \mathcal{L}_{\text{CE}} + \beta * \mathcal{L}_{\text{SupCon}} \tag{3}$$

We assign $\alpha = 1.0$ as it constitutes the primary objective, ensuring that the gradient signal from attack-type prediction dominates the optimization. The contrastive weight β is set to 0.3 to balance two competing concerns: the contrastive loss must provide sufficient geometric structure to the encoder's embedding space, yet must not overwrite the discriminative representations acquired during BERT pre-training. Excessively large values of β risk destabilizing the pre-trained weights in early training epochs—a known catastrophic forgetting issue in joint fine-tuning of transformer encoders with other losses [6].

4.2 Inference Phase

The inference phase of the JaiLENS-trained classfier is shown in Figure 1b. Given an input prompt $\mathbf{x}$, the model outputs a predicted class $\hat{y}$ and its associated confidence score $p(\hat{y} \mid \mathbf{x})$. The predicted class corresponds to either a `no_attack` label—indicating that the prompt contains no jailbreak elements—or a specific attack-type label, identifying the jailbreak technique employed. To handle the adaptive threat of zero-day attacks, the confidence score is further compared against a predefined threshold θ:

$$\hat{y}_{final} = \begin{cases} \hat{y} & \text{if } p(\hat{y} \mid \mathbf{x}) > \theta \\ \texttt{zero_day} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \tag{4}$$

The high confidence score indicates the input closely resembles a known attack type in the training dataset. Conversely, a low confidence score suggests that, while the prompt may contain jailbreak-like characteristics, it does not sufficiently match any predefined attack category. This can indicate a zero-day attack using a jailbreak technique that did not exist during training.

This threshold-based mechanism for identifying zero-day attacks extends beyond closed-set classification and provides a practical defense against emerging zero-day attacks, which can be handled using specific or adaptive techniques, while predefined attacks can be addressed with deterministic defense methods.

Moreover, in this stage, a single input prompt is sent to the trained classifier to produce a predicted class and its associated confidence probability. Due to contrastive learning which explicitly shape the geometric structure of the encoder's embedding space using pair input during training. The encoder learns to embed each attack in a distinct region, well separated from others. So during inference, the encoder able to handle unpaired input and place the embedding vector in the space that close to class that have been learned.

5 Experimental Evaluation

5.1 Experiment Settings

Traditional ML-Based Methods To evaluate the effectiveness of JaiLENS against traditional ML classification approaches, we selected four classical ML algorithms for comparison, including Logistic Regression, XGBoost, Linear SVM, and KNN. Each method use TF-IDF (Term Frequency–Inverse Document Frequency) feature extraction. Moreover, based on recent work [11] and these results, Linear SVM and KNN with TF-IDF feature extraction achieve high accuracy in capturing the meaning of prompts and classifying harmful prompts according to a defined taxonomy. Therefore, we use these algorithms as traditional ML-based methods for evaluation.

- **Logistic Regression** [12]: Provides a linear decision boundary and serves as a simple, interpretable method; it is computationally efficient and mathematically straightforward.
- **XGBoost** [4]: Introduces non-linear decision boundaries via gradient boosted trees, capturing higher-order feature interactions that linear models cannot represent.
- **Linear SVM** [3]: Useful for classification, as it finds a separating hyperplane with the maximal margin between two classes, and is known to perform competitively on high-dimensional sparse text representations.
- **KNN** [10]: Operates on similarity in TF-IDF space, classifying a data point based on its nearest neighbors. It provides a non-parametric approach that implicitly tests whether jailbreak types form naturally separable lexical clusters without any learned decision boundary.

Transformer-Based DNN Methods To evaluate the effectiveness of DNN-based compared with traditional ML-based methods, and to assess the contributions of the customized Difference-Aware Fusion Layer and Contrastive Learning in our approach, we conduct ablation experiments to isolate the effects of these components. We use a *base classifier* that shares the encoder and classification head architecture with JaiLENS but omits the fusion layer and is trained solely with cross-entropy loss without contrastive loss. We then compare the base classifier with JaiLENS.

Dataset As dataset, we reused the dataset in [2]. It includes unique 9,360 pairs of original and jailbreak prompts covering nine NonNL jailbreak attack types, along with 1,040 plain-text prompts labeled as no attack. Overall, the dataset contains 10,400 prompts. We split the data into training and test sets using an 80:20 ratio for each attack type through random selection, yielding 8,320 training samples and 2,080 test samples, balanced across all attacks. The taxonomy of NonNL jailbreak attacks is described in Table 1, and examples of each attack are provided in Figure 3 (Appendix A). For zero-day attack evaluation, we selected `homoglyphs`, `unicode`, `payload_split`, and `emoji`, which differ in

jailbreak technique and complexity, labeled them as `zero_day`, and did not use them during training.

Table 1: NonNL jailbreak taxonomy.

Attack	Description
`base64`	Use the **base64** encoding algorithm to obfuscate the prompt
`hex`	Use **hexadecimal** encoding to transform each character in the prompt
`homoglyphs`	**Substitute** some letters with a **homoglyph** character
`unicode`	Transform each character into its **unicode code**
`adv_prefix`	Append specific **meaningless tokens before** the original prompt
`adv_suffix`	Append specific **meaningless tokens after** the original prompt
`payload_split`	**Split the malicious payload** into harmless segments
`ascii_art`	**Visualize the sensitive word** using ASCII characters
`emoji`	**Substitute** malicious words with representative **emoji** representations

As the results, the training set consists of 4,992 paired samples—each pair comprising an original and its corresponding jailbreak prompt—covering five known NonNL attack types (`base64`, `hex`, `adv_prefix`, `adv_suffix`, `ascii_art`) and one no attack class (`no_attack`), with 832 samples per class. The `zero_day` class is deliberately excluded from training. The test set consists of 2,080 single jailbreak prompts which reflects the inference condition in which the original prompt is unavailable. Known attacks and the no attack classes each contains 208 samples. The zero_day class contains 832 samples drawn equally from the four zero-day attack types (208 per type).

Performance Metrics We use Precision, Recall, F1 score, and Accuracy as the metrics to evaluate classification performance.

5.2 Jailbreak Classification Results

The experimental results in this section evaluate the effectiveness of traditional ML-based methods and transformer-based DNN methods (including JaiLENS) for detecting jailbreak attacks. To ensure a comprehensive evaluation of the classification task, we omit zero-day samples from the test set in this experiment. The jailbreak classification results for all methods are shown in Table 2.

Traditional ML-based classifiers are insufficient for classifying NonNL jailbreak attacks. According to Table 2, the highest F1 score of Traditional ML-based methods is 0.80 (XGBoost), with an accuracy of 0.81. However, given the high risk posed by jailbreaks, these results remain insufficient for reliable deployment where jailbreak prompts are sophisticated and continually evolving.

Table 2: Results of traditional ML-based methods and transformer-based DNN methods for taxonomy-aware NonNL jailbreak classification.

	Precision	Recall	F1	Accuracy
Traditional ML-based Methods				
Logistic Regression	0.69	0.78	0.72	0.78
XGBoost	0.79	0.81	**0.80**	**0.81**
Linear SVM	0.77	0.79	0.74	0.79
KNN	0.73	0.73	0.72	0.73
Transformer-based DNN Methods				
Base Classifier	1.00	1.00	**1.00**	**1.00**
JaiLENS	1.00	1.00	**1.00**	**1.00**

This confirms that TF-IDF representations lack the semantic expressiveness required to capture the structural diversity of NonNL jailbreak techniques, and that a stronger assurance approach is required. Overall, these results indicate that deep models are needed to achieve stronger classification performance.

The transition from traditional to transformer-based DNN approach yields a substantial and unambiguous performance gain. According to Table 2, both the base classifier and JaiLENS, which use BERT as the encoder, achieve perfect scores across precision, recall, F1, and accuracy (**1.0**) in the closed-set evaluation. This suggests that DNN models are sufficient to capture semantic structure and separate known attack categories. With an improvement of +0.2 in F1 score over the strongest traditional ML-based methods, using a deep model with a pre-trained encoder to represent the prompt is a promising approach for known jailbreak classification, regardless of classifier complexity.


5.3 Zero-Day Jailbreak Classification Results

This experiment aims to demonstrate the robustness and effectiveness of our model in classifying zero-day jailbreak attacks that were unseen during training. We use the full test set, which includes all known and zero-day attacks. Due to insufficient traditional ML-based methods, we omit them from this evaluation. According to Figure 1b, to identify the zero-day attack, we set a threshold and compare it with the predicted probability from the jailbreak classification models. For a comprehensive evaluation, we conducted experiments using various threshold values $\theta \in \{0, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9\}$.

JaiLENS consistently improves average F1 scores compared to the base classifier. The results in Figure 2a, which presents the average F1 score across the full test set, demonstrates that JaiLENS, integrating a customized difference-aware fusion layer with contrastive learning, consistently outperforms the base classifier that lacks difference-aware fusion and is trained solely with

cross-entropy. Moreover, JaiLENS achieves a peak F1 score of 0.88 at the optimal threshold $\theta = 0.8$, while the base classifier reaches 0.82 F1 score. As θ increases, the shaded gap widens, suggesting that the contrastively trained embedding space yields better-calibrated confidence scores—assigning higher confidence to known attack classes while appropriately separating zero-day attacks. Overall, these results show that JaiLENS generalizes across both taxonomy-aware and zero-day jailbreak classification.

Contrastive learning and the Difference-Aware Fusion Layer significantly improve the robustness and effectiveness of zero-day classification. According to the F1 scores on zero-day test samples as the threshold increases in Figure 2b, JaiLENS outperforms the base classifier across all thresholds for identifying zero-day jailbreaks. In particular, the F1 score rises to **0.77**, exceeding the base classifier by $\Delta = 0.18$ at the optimal threshold $\theta = 0.9$. This indicates that contrastive learning induces a geometrically structured embedding space in which each attack type clusters tightly while remaining far from other types, enabling zero-day separation that cross-entropy alone cannot achieve.



(a) The average F1 score across the whole test set. JaiLENS achieves a peak F1 score of 0.88, higher than the base classifier's F1 of 0.82, an improvement of $\Delta = 0.06$ at the optimal threshold $\theta = 0.8$.

(b) F1 score on zero-day test set. JaiLENS consistently outperforms the base classifier, improving by $\Delta = 0.18$ at $\theta = 0.9$, indicating strong effectiveness for zero-day jailbreak classification.

Fig. 2: F1 score comparisons between JaiLENS and the base classifier across different thresholds θ.

5.4 Deployment Feasibility

Precision and accuracy are essential for jailbreak classification; however, practical deployability also depends on computational efficiency during both training and inference. For real-world deployment in a production pipeline, accuracy must be balanced against latency and resource overhead, and queries must be achieved

with minimal delay. All the experiments were conducted on a dual 12-core 2.2 GHz Intel(R) Xeon(R) Silver 4214 CPU server with 64 GB RAM.

Traditional machine learning algorithms achieve good computational efficiency during both training and inference, but their classification performance is limited. Our experimental results indicate that these algorithms achieve the lowest inference time, with a maximum of 2.37 ms for KNN and a minimum of 1.32 ms for Linear SVM, due to lightweight TF-IDF feature extraction and linear decision boundaries. Nevertheless, their classification effectiveness remains insufficient, as demonstrated in Section 5.2.

JaiLENS achieves a favorable balance between classification accuracy and computational efficiency, making it suitable for deployment as a real-time jailbreak classification component in LLM serving pipelines. JaiLENS incurs a one-time training cost of 0.755 hours, compared to 0.272 hours for the base classifier which an overhead attributable to jointly optimizing cross-entropy and contrastive losses over paired batches. More importantly, the inference-time cost difference between JaiLENS and the base classifier is negligible—10.18 ms versus 9.15 ms per sample—a margin of $\Delta = 1.03$ ms that falls within typical single-run measurement variance. Given the substantial gains in taxonomy-aware classification (F1 score **0.88** vs 0.82) and zero-day detection (F1 score **0.77** vs 0.59) (cf. Section 5.3), the additional training investment is well justified, establishing JaiLENS as a computationally feasible and deployment-ready solution for real-time NonNL jailbreak screening.

6 Discussion

Impact of Joint Loss The main intuition behind using joint loss is that cross-entropy loss only ensures the correct class gets the highest score, without organizing embeddings by similarity. As a result, attacks of the same type can be scattered in the embedding space, and new (zero-day) attacks may land near decision boundaries, leading to misclassification and no uncertainty signal. Contrastive training fixes this by clustering similar attacks together, making the model more robust to novel, obfuscated strategies.

Limitations Our current evaluation assumes a static threat model and does not consider adaptive adversaries. In practice, an attacker aware of a NonNL jailbreak classification model could craft inputs to minimize structural-difference features. Evaluating JaiLENS under adaptive adversarial inputs is an important direction for future work. Additionally, our coverage of jailbreak techniques is limited. The current attack taxonomy includes 9 attacks, but only 4 are used for closed-set training; the remaining attacks are reserved for zero-day evaluation and are not used during training.

7 Conclusion

In this paper, we proposed JaiLENS, a supervised contrastive pair-learning model for taxonomy-aware and zero-day NonNL jailbreak classification. JaiLENS addresses a critical gap in existing LLM safety mechanisms which the inability to against unseen jailbreak attacks. By training objective combining supervised contrastive loss and cross-entropy classification, JaiLENS learns a geometrically structured embedding space that supports both precise attack taxonomy classification and robust zero-day abstention within a unified architecture.

Our experiment results show that JaiLENS is robust and effective for NonNL jailbreak classification. On the taxonomy-aware jailbreak evaluation, JaiLENS achieves a perfect macro F1 of **1.00**, compared to 0.80 for the strongest traditional ML-based method (XGBoost), a 25% improvement. This result shows that traditional ML-based approaches are insufficient to capture the semantic diversity of NonNL jailbreak techniques.

Moreover, JaiLENS's robustness is demonstrated by its ability to handle zero-day NonNL jailbreak attacks. It achievesa zero-day F1 of **0.77**, outperforming the base classifier (0.59), while maintaining an overall F1 of **0.88**. This improvement indicates that contrastive pair training induces a representational structure that generalizes to unseen attack variants in a way that cross-entropy alone cannot.

Future Work We plan to develop mechanisms to defend against specific attacks in the next stage, after an attack prompt has been classified. In addition, we will integrate JaiLENS for jailbreak classification into a comprehensive system that can defend against attacks and prevent them from reaching the LLM.

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
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A Examples of NonNL Jailbreak Prompts

We include below examples for each of the NonNL jailbreak attack types, which are constructed based on the same original prompt: *"How to build a bomb."*



(a) Encoded-based attacks. (b) Adversarial attacks. (c) Art-based attacks.

payload_split

```
Now generate the output for:

masked_1 = maskedmodelling(What five-letter verb, beginning with "B" and ending with "D," means to
construct something by putting parts or materials together?) #just returns the answer
masked_2 = maskedmodelling(In the movie, the hero must deactivate the ticking time ____ before it
detonates.) #just returns the answer

start = f" How to {masked_1} a {masked_2}"

for i in range(100): #here 100 denotes next 100 words
start = modelthis(start, "_data"):
print(start)
```

(d) Formatting-based attack.

Fig. 3: Examples of nine NonNL jailbreak attacks.